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At the end of the summer of 1965, I was about to enter the fifth
grade of Public School #43, an all black elementary school in Indi-
anapolis, Indiana. Within six years, the courts ruled that Indianapo-
lis Public Schools practiced de jure segregation.' Yet, by my
parents' account, my education at PS #43 had been excellent and
my African-American teachers were all first-rate. Both of my par-
ents were public school teachers in the Indianapolis public school
system, so they understood the importance of a good education. I
had already met the woman scheduled to be my fifth grade teacher.
Mrs. McNeese was a warm-hearted person who was robust, both in
terms of personality and appearance. Even before classes started,
she had managed to make me feel welcome by telling me how much
she was looking forward to having me in her class in the fall.
Shortly before school began, my parents called their three sons
into the living room for an important announcement. The family
was going to move from our cramped, two-bedroom home in the
inner-city of Indianapolis, to a new spacious three-bedroom house
in one of Indianapolis suburban areas. We would be changing
schools. My parents cited the traditional reasons for moving: the
family was too large for the small house where we currently resided
and the new house had a much nicer yard.
My parents also indicated that our new school, where most of
the students and all of the teachers were white, would provide us
with the opportunity for a much better education than we were cur-
rently receiving at PS #43. Even to a fifth grader, who was used to
the world not making sense, this statement challenged my beliefs.
After all, hadn't I heard my parents often comment on the talents
possessed by my African-American teachers at PS #43? I could not
comprehend the notion that I would receive a better education in a
suburban school system than in my own community. Innocently, I
responded by asking, "Why will I receive a better education in a
school just because there are whites in it?" The question was one
my parents could not answer.2
I United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.
Ind. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
2 This Article is in part autobiographical. The experiences revolving from my
transition from de jure segregated inner-city public school to a desegregated suburban
school have haunted me for the past twenty-five years. The need to comprehend those
experiences has been the inspiration for this Article. I do not believe that this frank
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INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court opinions, like Brown v. Board of Education
("Brown I"), 3 reveal their consequences and yield their secrets only
through the perspective of time and the evolution of American soci-
ety. The Supreme Court candidly recognized this point seventeen
years after that opinion.4 Almost two generations have passed since
the Court decided Brown I. That passage of time allows us to put
into perspective a reexamination of the Supreme Court's opinions
regarding de jure segregation of public schools. 5
Reexamination is particularly appropriate at this time. In the
last two terms, the Supreme Court has issued two major opinions-
Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell6 and Freeman v. Pitts7-
addressing de jure segregation of public schools. With these opin-
ions, the Court entered the final phase of its efforts to eradicate the
vestiges of dejure segregation from American public education. In
this phase the Supreme Court has turned its attention to defining
what a school system must accomplish to free itself from federal
court supervision. This phase will herald the end of an epic chapter
in American legal history.
The Supreme Court has approved a number of means to rem-
edy the harm resulting from dejure segregation, with desegregation
as the principal means.8 Yet the Court has never supplied a satisfac-
tory justification for the remedies it has approved. Now that the
Court may be ready to close this chapter in its legal history, we may
possess all of the Court's insight into its analysis of the harm of de
jure segregation and the purposes of its remedies. At this stage,
Court-ordered remedies for dejure segregation, including desegre-
admission of my personal history is dangerous to scholarly objectivity, for reality is
never absolute, but rather depends upon one's personal experiences. See, e.g., Robert
W. Gordon, Critical Legal Studies, 10 LEGAL STUD. F. 335, 339 (1986); Mark Tushnet,
Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 505,
517 (1986); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise
of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 430-31 (1987). As these experiences and
others like it have shaped my consciousness, the lack of such experiences has no doubt
shaped the conscience of others.
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 "Nothing in our national experience prior to 1955 prepared anyone for dealing
with changes and adjustments of the magnitude and complexity encountered since
then" in the effort to eradicate the vestiges of de jure segregation in public schools.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971).
5 The terms "public school" and "public education" refer to public elementary
and secondary schools or public elementary and secondary education, respectively.
When I refer to public college and public post graduate institutions, I will specifically
note that in the context of such discussion.
6 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
7 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
8 I use the term "desegregation" to mean racial balancing, which contemplates
some form of integration between blacks and whites.
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gation, are an accomplished fact.9 Therefore, I do not take a posi-
tion on whether the remedies ordered for dejure segregation were
the most appropriate ones. Rather, I seek to demonstrate the new
harm that flows from the Court's ideological framework which justi-
fied these remedies.
In Freeman, the Court noted that a school system eliminates the
vesitiges of an unconsitutional de jure system when the injuries and
stigma inflicted upon the disfavored race are no longer present. 10
This statement captures the contradictory nature of the Supreme
Court's de jure segregation jurisprudence: on the one hand, the
Court suggests the harm is an amorphous stigma; and, on the other,
the Court suggests the harm is tangible. I will argue that the
Supreme Court's dejure segregation jurisprudence is generally con-
sistent with these two notions about the harms resulting from de
jure segregation. When, as the Court has done, these two distinct
notions are put together, then the remedies for dejure segregation
replicate the very disease they should have been intended to cure.
More recently, Supreme Court cases addressing issues in public
education have embraced the notion that public schools are cultural
institutions engaged in socializing America's children. As a result,
the objectives of public education are the inculcation of fundamen-
tal American values." In this Article, I will argue that the results,
not the rationale, of the Court's opinions addressing dejure segre-
gation are consistent with recognizing the importance of the social-
izing process of public schools. Viewing de jure segregation from
this perspective, its principal harm is stigmatic. In the public educa-
tion context, this stigmatic harm functions differently than it does in
any other area because the state is engaged in socializing students.
Dejure segregated public schools are inculcating a belief-the infer-
iority of African-Americans-to students that is inconsistent with the
9 If I were writing tabula rasa, I might be inclined to suggest remedies in addition
to those accepted by the Court. However, I do not find myself in that position. See
Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status Based
on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 939 (1990). As a
result, I am not addressing the propriety of the remedies that the Court ordered or
approved. Rather, I seek to provide an alternative justification for the remedies ordered
by the Court and to demonstrate the harm flowing from the Court's failure to provide
this alternative justification.
10 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443.
11 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding the au-
thority of public school officials to censor a student newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding the authority of public school officials to disci-
pline a student for the content of a vulgar speech delivered at a student assembly);
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (limiting school board's discretion to re-
move books from the school libraries); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (holding
that a New York statute forbidding permanent certification as a public school teacher to
any person who is not a United States citizen violates the Equal Protection Clause).
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values enshrined by the Constitution. The remedial purpose for
the inculcation of "the invidious value" should be directed towards
its elimination. Consequently, the primary beneficiary of these rem-
edies is either the socializing process of public schools or all public
school students, not only African-American school children.
The Court's ideological framework in this area, however, leads
to a different conclusion about both the harm resulting from dejure
segregation and its remedial purpose. The Court's ideological
framework proceeds from an assumption that racial isolation re-
tarded the intellectual and psychological development of only
African-Americans. Thus, the purpose of dejure segregation reme-
dies is to rectify some manifested deficiency of African-American
students.
Both the Court's interpretations of the harm of dejure segrega-
tion and its resulting remedial purpose make the Supreme Court's
de jure segregation jurisprudence suspect. On the one hand, the
harm of dejure segregation is inculcating the notion of black inferi-
ority to public school children. Yet, on the other hand, the reason
that remedies are necessary is because segregation actually retarded
the development of African-Americans, thus making them inferior
to Caucasians. As a result, remedies for de jure segregation are
based upon an assumption of African-American inferiority-the
same assumption that pervaded the constitutional violation of de
jure segregation. Just as past segregation distorted the socializing
process of public schools, remedies for de jure segregation have
done and are doing the same because of the Court's analysis of de
jure segregation of public schools.' 2
In Part I, I will present a theory that views the harm resulting
from de jure segregation from the perspective of the socializing
function of public schools. In Part II, I will discuss the implications
of two Supreme Court desegregation-termination cases, Dowell and
Freeman, and will show that these cases are consistent with the harm
of dejure segregation. In Part III, I will discuss what the purpose of
the remedies for de jure segregation should be. I will also contrast
the harm of de jure segregation of public schools in other contexts,
including higher education, in order to show why desegregation was
required for public schools. In Part IV, I will discuss the Supreme
Court's ideological framework that its de jure segregation jurispru-
dence is built upon. I will also show that this framework for dejure
segregation has led to a situation where the remedies for de jure
segregation are inculcating the invidious value and thereby repli-
cating the very disease they should be attempting to cure.
12 But see discussion of the Milliken H remedies, infra part IV.D.
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Because Supreme Court opinions are viewed by many as objec-
tive truth, the opinions can function as powerful "symbolic declara-
tions to guide, influence and endorse" policies made outside of a
strictly judicial forum.13 In Part V, I will discuss the impact that the
Court's ideological framework had on educators who addressed
public education reform after desegregation.
I
How DE JURE SEGREGATION INCULCATED A BELIEF IN THE
INFERIORITY OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS
A. The Socializing Function of Public Schools
Public schools are the "most vital civic institution for the pres-
ervation of a democratic system of government." 14 Education has
been considered necessary to preserve American democratic institu-
tions. Thomas Jefferson wrote, "I know no safe depository of the
ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we
think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a
wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to
inform their discretion by education."' 5 One commentator called
the American system of public education the fourth democratic in-
stitution in our system of checks and balances.16
Public schools perform a number of functions for American so-
ciety. The two most important overlap: value inculcation and aca-
demic training.' 7 Public schools are social institutions that cultivate
America's youth. They inculcate cultural values, including political
and social attitudes, opinions and beliefs. For example, schools fos-
ter such values as respect for our country, tolerance for political and
religious diversity, commitment to self-sufficiency, and commitment
to discharge faithfully the duties imposed by citizenship.' 8 Schools
teach these values by selecting and excluding the materials that
teachers present to students.' 9 They also instill values through a
13 Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 810
(1990).
14 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
15 DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954, 23
(1987) ("John Adams, James Madison and other[s] ... made similar pleas for an ex-
panded commitment to learning as a safeguard for the republic.").
16 TYACK ET. AL, .supra note 15, at 44-45.
17 For a discussion of how the invidious value inculcation theory addresses aca-
demic remedies, see infra notes 148-164, 217-273 and accompanying text.
18 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Plyer, 457 U.S. at 221.
19 See MARK YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKs 296-306 (1983); Mary H. Mitchell,
Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. REV. 603, 684 (1987).
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myriad of administrative rules and regulations governing student
and teacher conduct. 20
The Supreme Court's education jurisprudence has long recog-
nized the importance of education's socializing function. 21 Many of
the Court's recent opinions involving public schooling embrace
value-inculcation as the primary role of public education. 22 For ex-
ample, in Ambach v. Norwick 23 the Court was forced to determine
whether teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental func-
tion intimately tied to the operation of the state as a governmental
entity. 24 Addressing this issue, the Court stated that "[p]ublic edu-
20 See Mitchell, supra note 19, at 684. For example, rules prohibiting fighting on
school premises attempt to inculcate a belief that violence is not a legitimate means to
resolve a dispute. Rules requiring all students to attend the same classes and to start
school at the same time attempt to produce favorable attitudes toward dependability and
punctuality. Rules requiring students to commence their academic day by reciting the
pledge of allegiance to the flag attempt to produce patriotic sentiment. See, e.g., West Va.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that children cannot be compelled to salute
the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance in public schools).
21 Brown, supra note 9, at 1115-20; see, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). Prior to Brown I, the
Court had not addressed issues relating to public elementary and secondary schools
enough to develop an understanding of the primary role of public education. In Miners-
ville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the Supreme Court upheld a requirement
that children of Jehovah's Witnesses participate in the flag salute, even though the re-
quirement violated their religious convictions. The Court expressed little apprehension
in asserting that public elementary and secondary schools may socialize students, even if
the process is contrary to the wishes of the students' parents. Although the Court re-
versed its holding in Gobitis three years later, West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), the Court reaffirmed the importance of the socializing function of public ele-
mentary and secondary schools by upholding schools' authority to foster national unity.
The Court indicated that national unity was an end that school officials could foster, but
objected to compelling the fostering of national unity with the flag salute. Id. at 640-42.
Since Brown I, the Court has rendered numerous opinions centering primarily on
the socializing aspect of public education. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (invalidating a state statute that proscribed teaching evolution in public schools);
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating a state statute requir-
ing Bible reading in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that a
state may not require the reading of an official state prayer in public schools even if
pupils who wish to remain silent or be excused may do so); see also Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at
260 (upholding the authority of public school officials to censor a student newspaper);
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675 (upholding the authority of public school officials to discipline a
student for the content of a vulgar speech delivered at a student assembly); Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (limiting school board's discretion to remove books
from the school libraries); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (holding that a New
York statute forbidding permanent certification as a public school teacher to any person
who is not a United States citizen violates Equal Protection Clause).
22 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 278; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682; Pico, 457 U.S. at 864; Plyler,
457 U.S. at 222 n.20; Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-78. For an extended discussion of the
Supreme Court's recognition of the value inculcating function in these cases, see Brown,
supra note 9, 1117-20.
23 441 U.S. at 68.
24 Id. at 74-75. The case involved an Equal Protection challenge to a New York law
that forbade certification as a public school teacher to any person who was not a citizen
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cation, like the police function, fulfills a most fundamental obliga-
tion of government to its constituency. The importance of public
schools .. .in the preservation of the values on which our society
rests, long has been recognized by our decisions." 25
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,26 the Court upheld, against a
free speech challenge, the authority of school officials to discipline a
student for delivering an address at a student assembly in which he
used vulgar and offensive language. The Court rested its opinion
on the importance of the socializing function of public schools:
The role and purpose of the American public school system were
well described by two historians, who stated: "[P]ublic education
must prepare pupils for citizenship .... It must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government
in the community and the nation."'27
In Board of Education v. Pico,28 Justice Brennan, writing for a
three-justice plurality, wrote "[the Court has] acknowledged that
public schools are vitally important.., vehicles for 'inculcating fun-
damental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic polit-
ical system.' "29 In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun wrote
"[T]he Court has acknowledged the importance of the public
schools 'in the .. . preservation of values on which our society
rests.' Because of the essential socializing function of schools, local
education officials may attempt . . . to . . . '[awaken] the child to
cultural values.' "so Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, ar-
of the United States, unless that person manifested an intention to apply for citizenship.
The appellees, both foreign-born individuals who were otherwise qualified to teach,
challenged the law on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
employed a classification based on alienage. Although classifications based on alienage
are normally inherently suspect, there are exceptions for state functions that are inti-
mately tied to the operation of the state as a governmental entity. Id.
25 l at 76 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978)).
26 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
27 Id at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEw BASic HISTORY OF THE UNrrED
STATES 228 (1968)).
28 457 U.S. 853 (1982). In this case, school officials removed controversial books
from a public school library. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, held that stu-
dents possess a right to receive information, and whenever school officials remove books
from school libraries, they deny students access to ideas. Id. at 870-71.
29 Id. at 864 (quoting Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
30 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982) (Blackmun J., concurring)
(quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)) (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). Justice Blackmun rested his concurrence not on the right to
receive information but instead on improper suppression of ideas by the school officials.
1992]
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gued that the very nature of public education entails "the selective
conveyance of ideas." 3 '
As one commentator notes, "the choice of values to be trans-
mitted [in public schools normally] lies... with the political major-
ity or interest group in charge of the school system." 32 Historically,
because education has been primarily a local and state matter,
schools are concerned with the inculcation of local community val-
ues. 33 While there is broad agreement about fundamental values in
31 Id at 914. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and
Justice Powell. In criticizing Justice Brennan's assertion that students have a right to
read books that their school disapproves of, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[t]he idea that... students have a right to access, in the school, to informa-
tion other than that thought by their educators to be necessary is contrary
to the very nature of an inculcative education.... Education consists of
the selective presentation and explanation of ideas .... Thus, Justice
Brennan cannot rely upon the nature of school libraries to escape the fact
that the First Amendment right to receive information simply has no ap-
plication to the one public institution which, by its very nature, is a place for the
selective conveyance of ideas.
Id at 914-15 (emphasis added).
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), the Court ad-
dressed content-based censorship by a school principal of articles that were to appear in
a student newspaper. In upholding the principal's decision to censor the articles, Justice
White, writing for the majority, repeatedly noted the importance of public elementary
and secondary schools in awakening children to cultural values. Id. at 272. In dissent,
Justice Brennan noted that "[public elementary and secondary schools inculcate] in to-
morrow's leaders the fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system.... All the while, the public educator nurtures the students' social and
moral development by transmitting to the man the official dogma of community values."
Id at 278 (citations omitted).
The Court also noted the importance of the value-inculcating function of public
schools. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). In Plyler, the Court noted "the signifi-
cance of education to our society is not limited to its political and cultural fruits. The
public schools are an important socializing institution, imparting those shared values
through which social order and stability are maintained." Id. at 222 n.20.
See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting):
Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for
the preservation of a democratic system of government. Education
serves the essential function of instilling in our young an understanding
of and appreciation for the principles and operation of our governmental
processes.
Id at 113-14 (citations omitted).
32 Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First
Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309, 316 (1980). As noted by
Professors Arons and Lawrence, this problem was also perceived by John Stuart Mill:
[S]tate-sponsored education.., is a mere contrivance for moulding peo-
ple to be exactly like one another, and as the mould in which it casts them
is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether
this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the
existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it estab-
lishes a despotism over the mind ....
Id. at 316 n.22 (quotingJoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 190-91 (1859)).
33 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50.
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the abstract, when applied to concrete situations, that broad agree-
ment often breaks down. When the Supreme Court accepts some
decisions by politicians and school officials and rejects others, it is
essentially choosing one value over another.3 4 From the perspective
of the socializing function of public schools, the Court, in approach-
ing public education issues, should be concerned about public
schools inculcating the "proper" values.
B. The Harm Resulting From De Jure Segregation From the
Perspective of the Value-Inculcating Function of Public
Schools
The harm resulting from dejure segregation was its impact on
the socializing process of public schools. Dejure segregation of stu-
dents, teachers, staff and administrators amounted to administrative
rules that inculcated the invidious value-a belief in the inferiority
of African-Americans.
1. The Meaning Behind Racial Separation in Public Schools
In order to determine if there was a distortion of the socializing
process produced by racial imbalance, we must focus on the values
that were instilled by racial imbalance. Not all racial separation in
public schools can be equated to the invidous value. The values be-
ing socialized by the racial imbalance derive from the beliefs that led
to the separation of black and white school children. In the 1973
case of Keyes v. School District No. 1,3 5 the Court ruled that de jure
segregation and not de facto segregation violated the Constitu-
tion.3 6 Unlike de facto segregation, which could be established by
showing racial concentration of students in the public schools, de
jure segregation was defined as a "current condition of segregation
34 Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Toward a Theory of Government Expression
and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 863, 899 (1979).
35 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
36 For a description of the racial climate leading up to the litigation in Denver, see
J. HARVIE WIuNSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKE 195-98 (1979), and James J. Fishman &
Lawrence Strauss, Endless Journey: Integration and the Provision of Equal Educational Opportu-
nity in Denver's Public Schools: A Study of Keyes v. School District No. 1, in JusTICE AND
SCHOOL SYSTEMS 185-89 (Barbara Flicker ed., 1990).
At least one commentator has argued that the actions of the Denver School Board
could not have constituted intentional segregation. See Mark G. Yudof, Nondiscrimination
and Beyond, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 97 (Walter G. Stephan & Joe R. Feagin eds.,
1980). But see Keyes v. School District No. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1519-20 (D. Colo.
1985) (chastising the school board for its uncooperative behavior during the desegrega-
tion process), aft'd, 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 951 (1991);
Fishman & Strauss, supra, at 189-200 (discussing how the Denver School Board resisted
efforts to desegregate the school after the determination of liability for segregation).
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resulting from intentional state action directed specifically to [segre-
gate schools]."' 7
In segregationist states, which were primarily the border states
and the states of the old Confederacy, segregation was accom-
plished through state statutes.38 The system of segregation in the
pre-Brown South represented three hundred years of racial oppres-
sion. Statutory segregation in southern public schools was merely a
part of a larger segreationl system.3 9 The assumption that gener-
ated statutory segregation of public school students is unmistakably
clear and deeply rooted in the history of the South: African-
Americans are inferior to whites.40 Segregation was designed to
perpetuate this assumption.4 1 It was the product of the prevailing
and historical belief in the inferiority of African-Americans. 42
37 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 205-06. Woodward and Armstrong present the justices' pri-
vate deliberations about Keyes as regarding the limitations of desegregation remedies.
BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
260-68 (1979). While the Keyes Court rejected de facto segregation as the basis of the
constitutional harm, it also adopted a procedural rule that made proving dejure segre-
gation easier. If plaintiffs establish intentional segregation in a portion of the school
system, the Court will presume that unlawful segregation exists throughout the school
system. 413 U.S. at 208-09. This presumption alleviates plaintiffs of an enormous bur-
den in proving unlawful segregation for each school in the system in order to establish a
system-wide remedy. I do not deny that Keyes can be viewed as a political compromise
by the Court regarding the limitation on the desegregation remedy. By rejecting de
facto segregation, however, the Court also rejected the notion that the constitutional
harm fell solely on African-American school children.
38 Topeka, Kansas was not in a segregationist state, but rather in one of the four
states with legislation that merely permitted but did not require school segregation. My
analysis of Brown I indicates that the Court treated those school systems that were segre-
gated pursuant to permissible state authority similarly to the treatment afforded segre-
gation in the segregationist states.
39 In Brown I, the brief filed by the United States urged the Court "to bear in mind
that school segregation was not an isolated phenomenon but 'part of a larger social
pattern of racial relationship.'" RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 726 (1975).
40 The institutionalized racial apartheid was the paradigmatic practice of racism.
See, e.g., GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY 239 (1981); DAVID R. GOLDFIELD,
BLACK, WHITE, AND SOUTHERN: RACE RELATIONS AND SOUTHERN CULTURE 1940 TO THE
PRESENT 12 (1990); GUNNER MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 640 (1944); C. VANN
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW (3d. ed. 1974); Charles R. Lawrence III,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431, 439-41
(1990).
41 In most of the segregationist states, statutory segregation came down "in apos-
tolic succession from slavery and the Dred Scott case.... [S]egregation was an integral
part of the movement to maintain and further 'white supremacy'..." Charles L. Black,
Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424-25 (1960). Historian
C. Vann Woodward has argued that segregation became necessary only after the demise
of slavery. There was a virtual absence of segregation in the antebellum South. Segre-
gation would have been inconvenient and an obstruction to the efficient functioning of
slavery. The mere policing of the slaves and the exaction of involuntary labor required
more or less constant scrutiny. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 12.
42 According to several social scientists, "historically segregation patterns in the
United States were developed on the assumption of the inferiority of the segregated."
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When de facto segregation of black and white school children
that was not pursuant to statutory authority existed, the racial sepa-
ration was normally not complete. The courts were faced with de-
termining the meaning attached to this racial imbalance. 43 Courts
ruled that this racial imbalance violated the Equal Protection Clause
only when it was the result of invidious intent. By focusing on the
intent of school officials, the courts could assess the meaning at-
tached to racial imbalance of school children in a local community.44
School officials are either elected by the local majoritarian political
process or appointed by locally elected officials. If their views are
too far removed from those of the community, the political process
Floyd H. Allport et al., The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social
Science Statement, 37 MINN. L. REV. 427, 432-33 (1953). As Justice Harlan stated in his
dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, segregation "proceed[ed] on the ground that
colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
coaches occupied by white citizens." 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896). According to one
scholar, ChiefJustice Warren noted as much when he opened the Supreme Court's con-
ference on Brown I by stating that the "Court's precedents sustaining segregation could
rest only on a theory that [African-Americans] were inferior." KENNETH L. KARST, BE-
LONGING TO AMERICA 17 (1989).
43 The racial segregation in the public schools challenged in Keyes did not arise in
an area of the country that shared the segregationists states' history of racism. At the
time of the Civil War, approximately 92% of all blacks lived in states with legalized
slavery. According to the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Cen-
sus, the "South" today is comprised of the states of the Old Confederacy as well as
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SER. P-23, No. 80, THE SocIAL AND
ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL
VIEW, 1790-1978, 254 (1979) [hereinafter HISTORICAL VIEW]. For most northern and
western states, there was very little historical African-American presence. As late as
1910, 89% of African-Americans still resided in the South. Even as late as 1940, four-
teen years before Brown I, 77% of Afr-can-Americans still resided in the states of the Old
Confederacy or the border states. Id. at 13.
Nevertheless, it does appear that racial segregation was more of a northern doctrine
than a southern one, and that government action was as important in establishing segre-
gation in the North as it was in the South. Id. at 22. See generally LEON F. LrrWACK,
NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATE (1961) (presenting an authoritative
account of the treatment of African-Americans north of the Mason-Dixon Line). Never-
theless, few would argue that blacks were historically subjected to more discriminatory
treatment in the South than the North.
At the time that the school segregation cases began their climb through the lower
courts, state constitutional provisions, state statutes, or local ordinances made segre-
gated schools a requirement in 17 southern and border states and the District of Colum-
bia. These states are listed infra note 235. Four other states, Arizona, Kansas, New
Mexico and Wyoming, had legislation that "permitted the maintenance of segregated
schools on an optional basis." ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE C. FERGUSON, JR., DE-
SEGREGATION AND THE LAW 6 (2d ed. 1962).
44 The Keyes Court also noted that to determine whether a school was segregated
required more than a focus limited to the racial and ethnic composition of faculty and
staff, but additionally required that "community and administration attitudes" toward the
schools be taken into account. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added). The primary
focus of determining whether or not de jure segregation existed, however, was on the
intent of school officials. Id at 201-03.
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provides a remedy for the incongruence. Therefore, school offi-
cials' decisions, including those related to student, teacher, adminis-
trative, and staff assignments, tend to embody local consensus
values. Proving invidious intent by school officials to segregate stu-
dents is central to establishing the meaning behind the racial imbal-
ance of black and white children and to determing the values being
socialized by such racial imbalance. Establishing invidious intent is
tantamount to proving that the meaning attached to the separation
of blacks and whites in schools was a belief in the inferiority of
African-Americans. 45 If the racial imbalance was not the result of
invidious intent, then it did not distort the socializing process of
public schools.
2. The Meaning Behind the Systematic Underfunding of Schools
Attended by African-Americans
Schools do more than socialize students, they also perform an
important academic role. Schools disseminate information, teach
basic academic skills, provide students with vocational skills,46 and
assist in the cognitive development of children.47 While courts
should not view the harm of de jure segregation from the perspec-
45 This theory should not be taken as an endorsement of the intent test as a pre-
ferred means for addressing issues related to discrimination outside the context of pub-
lic schools. For critiques of the intent test, see, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987);
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935
(1989). This theory merely suggests that discovering the intent of school officials seems
to be the best method for determining the message attached to certain administrative
rules used by public schools. It is the belief supporting the administrative rules that
determines the values being inculcated by such rules in public schools. As a result, in
the context of public education, the intent test is actually transformed into an effects-
oriented approach because intent best reflects the primary effects of the socializing pro-
cess of public schools.
46 The vocational skills function is placed under the academic function. Skills
learned in public schools that make students more employable are often viewed as basic
academic skills: primarily reading, writing, and math. For example, in Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), the plaintiff
sued his school district claiming educational malpractice because the school system
failed to teach him basic academic skills. He sought damages for loss of earnings capac-
ity because his inability to read and write limited his employment opportunities. Id at
856-57. In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979),
the plaintiff also claimed educational malpractice. The thrust of the plaintiff's complaint
was that, "notwithstanding his receipt of a certificate of graduation, he lack[ed] even the
rudimentary ability to comprehend written English on a level sufficient to enable him to
complete applications for employment." Id at 1353; see Hunter v. Board of Educ. of
Montgomery County., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982); Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New
York, 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979).
47 William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The Supreme Court's Educational
Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REv. 939, 942 (1987).
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tive of the academic function of public schools, 48 academics is not
irrelevant to defining that harm.49 Rather, the academic role of
public schools must be examined with regard to its impact on their
socializing function.
48 In Brown I, the Court did suggest that an academic harm flowed from de jure
segregation. The academic harm, however, was seen as a derivative harm of the psycho-
logical harm: "'Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detri-
mental effect upon the colored children.... mhe policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority
affects the motivation of a child to learn.'" Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting Brown v.
Board of Educ. of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 347 U.S.
483 (1954)).
At the time the Court rendered its opinion in Brown I, it may have expected that
significant academic benefits would accrue to African-American students by attending
schools with Caucasian children. The possiblity that psychological relief would increase
academic performance was also implicit in the report filed by a group of social scientists
working in the area of race relations. The report was attached as an appendix to the
appellant's briefs filed in Brown L See Allport et al., supra note 42, at 430. The social
science evidence cited by the Court also implied that increased academic performance
would be the result. See Brown , 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11. For a full explanation of why the
Court should not view remedies for de jure segregation from the perspective of the
academic function, see Brown, supra note 9, at 1141-46.
49 In Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), see supra notes 21-24 and accompany-
ing text, the Court had an opportunity to resolve the equal protection challenge posed
by the appellees by focusing on the academic function of public schools. If the Supreme
Court views the academic function of public schools as its primary function, then the
categorical prohibition of aliens from teaching in public schools, which was the issue in
Ambach, would not make constitutional sense. This point was made by Justice Blackmun
in his dissent,joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Blackmun asserted that
"[i]t seems constitutionally absurd, to say the least, that in these lower levels of public
education a Frenchman may not teach French or, indeed an English woman may not
teach the grammar of the English language." Id. at 84. Blackmun also posed two rhe-
torical questions which indicated that he was primarily viewing public schools from the
perspective of their academic function as opposed to their value-inculcating function:
Is it better to employ a poor citizen teacher than an excellent resident
alien teacher? Is it preferable to have a citizen who has never seen Spain
or a Latin American country teach Spanish to eighth graders and to deny
that opportunity to a resident alien who may have lived for 20 years in the
culture of Spain or Latin America?
Id. at 87.
The answer, to Blackmun's rhetorical questions depend upon the Court's view of
the primary function of public education. If the primary function is the academic func-
tion, then the answer to both questions is an emphatic "NO1I" From the perspective of
the academic function the primary consideration would be the ability of resident aliens,
vis-a-vis American citizens, to teach basic skills and to disseminate useful information to
students. Obviously some resident aliens in certain subjects will be better equipped to
perform that task than some American citizens.
If, however, the primary mission of public education is proper socialization, then
the answer is not so dear. The Court is presuming that the loyalties of American citi-
zens to this country will be stronger than those of resident aliens, especially aliens who
have chosen not to apply for citizenship. If one is more concerned about properly instil-
ling students with fundamental American values as opposed to teaching them to speak
Spanish, then constitutionally it may be better to have an American citizen who has
never seen Spain or Latin America teach Spanish rather than a resident alien who has
lived in Spain or Latin America for over 20 years.
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Even though the Brown I Court reasoned that physical facilities
and other tangible resources of the black public schools were essen-
tially equal to the white public schools,50 in three of the four state
cases the physical facilities and other tangible resources were not
equal. 51 During the Plessy period of "separate but equal," black
public schools were seldom equal. 52 Powerful southerners consid-
ered the education of white children more important than the edu-
cation of black children. White public schools were better funded,
with longer school terms, more highly paid teachers and better
physical facilitites than black public schools. 53 For example, in 1945
South Carolina spent three times more per child for the education
of white children than it did for black children. 54 In the same year,
50 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492.
51 In 1951, when the complaint in Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951),
rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483- (1954), was filed, Clarendon
County spent $43 on the education of each black student as compared to $166 for each
white student. I.A. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND THE DE-
FENSE OF SEGREGATION, 1954-1966 29 (1967). A three-judge federal district court had
denied relief in this case but ordered the defendants to take steps to equalize the public
schools promptly and to report back in six months. Id. at 537-38. Subsequently, the
court found that the county was equalizing the schools "as rapidly as was humanly possi-
ble." Briggs v. Elliot, 103 F. Supp. 920, 922 (E.D.S.C. 1952), rev'd sub nom. Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
In Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev'd sub nom.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a three-judge district court admitted the
inadequacy of the Negro school in Prince Edward County, Virginia. Id. at 340. The
panel simply ordered the School Board to "pursue with diligence and dispatch" the
building program it had already commenced. Id. at 341.
In Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed a decision by
the Court of Chancery that ordered the admission of Negro students to previously
white-only schools. The court ordered the desegregation remedy because the schools
attended by blacks were not physically equal to those attended by whites. Id. at 152.
The Supreme Court of Delaware, however, implied that segreation laws might be en-
forced once the school facilities were equalized. Id.
See also JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935,
148-83 (1988); HENRY A. BULLOCK, A HISTORY OF NEGRO EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH 216-
19 (1967); Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education for Minoritiy Pupils: Brown Confounded
or Confirmed, in SHADES OF BROWN 108, 118-19 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
52 The willful and flagrant violation of the equality portion of the P/esy principle
has been extensively documented. See, e.g., HORACE M. BOND, NEGRO EDUCATION IN AL-
ABAMA (1939); HORACE M. BOND, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN SO-
CIAL ORDER (1934); Louis R. HARLAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1958); ROBERT A.
MARGO, DISENFRANCHISEMENT, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND THE ECONOMICS OF SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES SOUTH, 1890-1910 (Stuart Brady ed., 1985);J. Morgan
Kousser, Progressivism-For Middle-Class Whites Only: North Carolina Education, 1880-1910,
46J. Soc. HIST. 169 (1980).
53 DIANE RAvITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION 1945-1980, 121
(1983).
54 Id. In 1930, South Carolina actually spent eight times as much for the education
of whites than it did for the education of blacks.
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Mississippi spent four and one-half times more per child on white
schools than on black schools. 55
The systematic undervaluing and underfunding of the educa-
tion of African-Americans stemmed from the same assumption that
produced segregated schools. The education of African-Americans
was undervalued and underfunded because African-American
school children were not perceived as equals of Caucasian school
children.56
C. The Harm to the Socializing Process of Public Schools is an
Institutional Harm
The harm resulting from dejure segregation is an institutional
harm that can be conceptualized in two ways. One way is to view
harms relating to a distortion of the socializing process as harms
affecting the rights of all students in public schools. The right that
students possess in public schools is not the right to a socializing
process where the values instilled by public schools are consistent
with their own belief. Rather, it is the right to be subjected to a
socializing process that imparts values consistent with the Constitu-
tion, regardless of the students' (or their parents') personal predi-
lections for various value choices. A second way to conceptualize
the institutional harm of dejure segregation is to view the Constitu-
tion as prohibiting public schools from inculcating certain values.
Unlike the former, this conceptualization is not centered on the
rights of students but focuses on the limitations of the state's role as
educator.57
55 Id. In 1929, Mississippi spent as much as nine times more for the education of a
white child than for a black child.
56 Scientific racism had long been accepted to justify the Negro's place in the
South. Before the Civil War, science provided a major justification for proslavery think-
ing. See, e.g., WItLIA STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
RACE IN AMERICA 1815-1859 (1960). Scientists such as Josiah Nott of Alabama, Samuel
George Norton of Philadelphia, and Louis Agassiz of Harvard were convinced of the
innate inferiority of the slaves. They were able to buttress their beliefs by drawing sup-
port from the latest research and most authoritative speculation in anthropology, an-
thropometry, phrenology and egyptology. NEWBY, supra note 51, at 8-9. These scientific
attitudes regarding the inferiority of blacks were not significantly altered by the Civil
War or America's ensuing period of Reconstruction. The mainstream of scientific
thought after 1865 continued to articulate a belief in racial inequality. See, e.g., THOMAS
F. GoSSETr, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 253-86 (1963).
For a discussion of the views of segregtionists regarding the inferiority of African-
Americans, see, e.g., JAMES J. KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGA-
TION (1962); NEwBY, supra note 51.
57 The existence of this dichotomy can be seen in the difference between the plural-
ity opinion ofJustice Brennan and the concurring opinion ofJustice Blackman in Board
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). For Brennan, whether the removal of the books
from the library violated the Constitution rested on whether the students' right to re-
ceive information was abridged. Id. at 866-68 (plurality opinion). Therefore, he viewed
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The concept of institutional harm, with its primary emphasis on
the rights of students, is illustrated in Supreme Court cases that ad-
dress religious socialization in public schools.58 For example, some
students would not object to starting their school day with Bible
reading or voluntary school prayer.59 Despite this fact, the rights of
all students are harmed by such practices because all students are
subjected to a distorted socializing process. Even those children
who would not object to religious socialization are harmed60 be-
cause their rights are to a socializing process in public schools where
the values being inculcated do not violate the Establishment Clause.
Reconceptualizing the right to receive information, which was
recognized by Justice Brennan in Board of Education v. Pico, 61 pro-
the issue from the notion that students' would be harmed by such a removal. Id. Black-
mun, on the other hand, placed his emphasis on limitations placed on public schools.
For Blackmun, the issue was not whether students' rights were abridged by officials'
decisions, but rather whether school officials exceeded their authority by suppressing
thought. Id. at 876-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
58 See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating statute providing for
a moment of silence or voluntary prayer); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (invalidating a state statute requiring Bible reading in public schools); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that a state may not require the reading of an offi-
cial state prayer in public schools even if pupils who wish to remain silent or be excused
may do so).
59 See, e.g., T. LAHAYE, THE BATrLE FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOoLs 241 (1983)
The reverential awe of the Lord is the beginning or foundation of wis-
dom. If the educational foundation is in error, the education itself will be
in error. The only exception lies in areas like math, linguistics, meter-
ology, and a few others where exacting material facts are required. But
the more philosophical a, course, the more vulnerable its conclusions to
humanist error. Why do you think all humanists with one accord
vigourously oppose permitting little children to bow their heads and offer
a voluntary prayer? It isn't the prayer they object to-it is the fact that
the public schools would be acknowledging there is someone up there to
whom our children would be praying. Since these educational atheists
control our schools, they will not permit it....
60 This may perhaps explain Justice Brennan's position in Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987), where he states: "Families entrust public schools with the educa-
tion of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom
will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private
beliefs of the student and his or her family." Id at 584. Justice Brennan may be trying
to say that it does not matter whether or not this religious socialization is consistent with
the belief of some parents, but simply that it is an activity that schools should not engage
in at all.
61 457 U.S. 853 (1982). Justice Brennan's view on the "right to receive informa-
tion" applied only when school officials were removing books from the school library as
a result of improper motives. Id. at 870-72 (plurality opinion). The right to receive
information has been criticized because of conceptual problems. See, e.g., Stanley
Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy'" Value Training in Public
Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 15, 54-59 (1987); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at 910-20 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
I believe that many of the flaws in Justice Brennan's theory of the right to receive
information rest upon the view that the right flows from the academic function of public
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vides another illustration. In Pico, the Court ruled that school offi-
cials violated students' right to receive information when the
officials removed controversial books from the school library.62 To
illustrate more clearly when this right to receive information is vio-
lated, Brennan described a situation in which a Democratic school
board, motivated by party affiliation, orders the removal of all books
written by or in favor of Republicans. 63 Not all students would ob-
ject to the removal of these books. Some would consider such a
situation not only to be in their own personal interest, but would
argue that it was also in the best interest of all students. The re-
moval of such books, however, violates the rights of all students.
The motives of the Democratic school board in singling out these
books for removal have corrupted the socializing process. The
school is instilling a belief that the Democratic Party is better than
the Republican party. Regardless of the fact that some students may
actually share the school board's convictions, the value consistency
between these students' beliefs and that of the Democratic school
board is irrelevant. The value that the Democratic school board is
attempting to inculcate harms all students because all students are
subjected to a distorted socializing process.
Conceptualizing dejure segregation in this manner accepts the
assertion that all students, white and black, were harmed by dejure
segregation. The fact that many Caucasian students, like the reli-
gious students or the Democratic students, might not object to the
values being inculcated by the public schools is irrelevant. The
rights of students are not to a socializing process in which the values
instilled are consistent with their beliefs, but rather to a socializing
process in which the values inculcated are consistent with the Con-
stitution. In dejure segregation, when the inculcated values are in-
consistent with the Constitution, the rights of all students, including
Caucasian students, are violated.
A second way of conceptualizing the institutional harm related
to distortions of the socializing process of public schools is to view
the Constitution as embodying a prohibition on the inculcation of
certain values by local school districts. As indicated earlier, when
schools. Brennan appears to see the right as the required exposure to a certain body of
information. If the right is reconceptualized to focus not on the academic function of
public schools, but on the socializing function of public schools, then it would make
more sense. The right would therefore be seen as a right to non-biased value inculcat-
ing education.
62 Pico, 457 U.S. at 871. Justices Marshall and Stevens joined Brennan's plurality
opinion.
63 Id. at 870-71. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, while sharply critical of Brennan's
opinion, agreed that such political censorship would violate the Constitution. Id. at 907
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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the Supreme Court accepts some decisions by politicians and school
officials and rejects others, it is essentially choosing one value over
another.64 When values that local governments wish to advance, in
their role as educators, are inconsistent with values enshrined in the
Constitution, the local values must give way. 65 Pursuant to this
view, religious socialization-struck down by the Court-is simply in
conflict with the value of religious neutrality enshrined by the Reli-
gious Clauses of the First Amendment.66 The Constitution also
prohibits public schools from inculcating partisan political beliefs,
because doing so would have an adverse impact on the future of our
political process.
It does not matter what impact the inculcation of the substan-
tive values advocated by the public schools has upon various sub-
groups of students. The harm to those students who disagree with
the value being advanced by the public schools, as well as the bene-
fit derived from those who agree, is simply irrelevant. Government
cannot engage in this type of socialization, irrespective of whether
groups of students can or cannot demonstrate a given harm. In the
context of de jure segregation, whether African-American students
were harmed is also irrelevant. The Equal Protection Clause rests
upon the value of racial equality, and public schools cannot attempt
to instill a contrary belief.
II
THE COURT'S RECENT SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
DECISIONS-WHAT IT MEANS To ERADICATE THE
VESTIGES OF THE PRIOR DE JURE
SEGREGATION
In the last two terms the Supreme Court issued three major
opinions addressing the issue of de jure segregation in public
schools and public colleges. The first two cases, Board of Education v.
Dowel167 and Freeman v. Pitts,68 addressed issues relating to the ter-
mination of all or part of an existing court decree for public school
systems that attempt to eradicate the vestigies of prior de jure con-
64 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
65 See Ingber, supra note 61, at 68-71. Professor Tussman has talked about govern-
ment's role when acting as educator as exercising its inherent teaching power. JOSEPH
TusSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 51-85 (1977); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at 910 (Rehn-
quist,J., dissenting) (arguing that government as educator is subject to fewer limitations
than when operating as sovereign).
66 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968).
67 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
68 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
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duct. The third decision, United States v. Fordice,6 9 addressed, for the
first time, the standards to apply in determining whether the affirm-
ative obligation to dismantle a prior de jure segregated school sys-
tem in the university context had been met. I will discuss Dowell and
Freeman in this Part.
A. Board of Education v. Dowell
In Dowell, the Supreme Court was faced with its first opportu-
nity to address issues relating to the termination of school desegre-
gation decrees. The Oklahoma City school desegregation case
commenced in 1961 with the filing of a complaint by African-
American students and their parents against the Board of Education
of Oklahoma City.70 In the ensuing years, the parties struggled
through the difficult task of formulating a desegregation plan. This
process culminated in 1972 when the district court imposed a de-
segregation plan known as the Finger Plan. 71 In 1977 the district
court, pursuant to a motion by the Board, terminated case supervi-
sion and found that the Finger Plan achieved the court's objectives
and that the school system was therefore "unitary. ' 72 Although the
69 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
70 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 633. In 1963, the District Court found that Oklahoma City
was operating a dual school system and had intentionally segregated schools in the past.
Dowell v. School Bd. of Okla. City, 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
71 Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City, 338 F. Supp. 1256, aff'd 465 F.2d 1012
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). In 1972, the district court ordered the
Board to adopt a desegregation plan known as the "Finger Plan." Under the Finger
Plan, kindergartners would be assigned to neighborhood schools unless their parents
wished otherwise. African-American children in grades one to four would attend for-
merly all-white schools. Children in grade five would attend formerly all-black schools.
Thus, the African-American children were to be transported from grades one through
four and the white children were transported only for grade five. Students in the upper
grades would be bussed to various areas to maintain integrated schools. In integrated
neighborhoods, there would be stand alone schools for all grades. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at
633.
72 The Supreme Court noted that the meaning of the word "unitary," as used by
the district court, was unclear. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 635. The Court also noted that
lower courts had been inconsistent with their use of the term "unitary." Id. "Some
[courts] have used [unitary] to identify a school district that has completely remedied all
vestiges of past discrimination and therefore accomplished its constitutional obligation.
.." Ii.; see, e.g., United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987); Riddick
v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 533-34 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 979 U.S. 938
(1986); Vaughns v. Board of Educ. of Prince George's County, 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th
Cir. 1985).
Other courts, however, have used "unitary" to describe any school dis-
trict that has currently desegregated student assignments, whether or not
that status is solely the result of a court-imposed desegregation plan....
[S]uch a school district could be called unitary and nevertheless still con-
tain vestiges of its past discrimination.
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 635; see, e.g., Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v.
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11 th Cir. 1985). The Court stated that it was not sure that it
was useful to define these terms more precisely or to create subclasses within them.
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motion was contested, the district court's order was not appealed.
The Board, however, did not seek to change the Finger Plan until
1984.
In 1984 the Board of Education adopted a student reassign-
ment plan ("SRP") for the 1985-86 school year. Unlike the Finger
Plan, the SRP relied on neighborhood school assignments for stu-
dents in grades Kindergarten through 4. The Board argued that
changes in demographics made the increased travel distance that
young African-Americans were bussed too burdensome. In addi-
tion, the Board asserted its desire to increase parental involvement
in the schools. The Board felt that parental involvement was neces-
sary for quality education and that neighborhood school assign-
ments would increase such involvement.73 The result of the SRP,
however, was to increase significantly the racial imbalance of stu-
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636. The Court found that "[the District Court's 1977 order was
unclear with respect to what was meant by unitary and the necessary result of that find-
ing." Id. This contradicted the Court's holding in Pasadena Bd. of Education v. Span-
gler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), requiring a precise statement to the school board of its
obligations under a desegregation decree. See also Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443-44 (advis-
ing caution with regards to the use of the term "unitary").
After the Finger Plan was implemented, the Board of Education moved, in June
1975, to close the case on the ground that it had eliminated all vestiges of state imposed
racial discrimination in its school system and that it was operating a unitary school sys-
tem. Although the motion was contested, the district court in 1977 terminated active
supervision of the case because it found the desegregation plan had achieved its objec-
tive. The district court held in its "Order Terminating Case":
The Court has concluded that [the Finger Plan] worked and that substan-
tial compliance with the constitutional requirements has been achieved.
The School Board, under the oversight of the Court, has operated the
Plan properly, and the Court does not forsee that the termination of its
jurisdiction will result in the dismantlement of the Plan or any affirmative
action by the defendant to undermine the unitary system so slowly and
painfully accomplished over the 16 years during which the cause has been
pending before this court.
Dowell v. Board of Educ., No. CIV-9452, (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 1977) (quoting Board of
Educ. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
73 When the Board adopted its new plan, it was convinced that parental involve-
ment was essential to student academic achievement and quality education. In 1969
there were 95 parent-teacher associations in Oklahoma City School District with a total
membership of 26,528. When the Board implemented the SRP, there were only 15
PTAs with a total membership of 1,377. After the SRP had been in operation for just
two years, the number of PTA organizations had increased by 200% and membership
had increased by 144%. Open house attendance was up 5,167. 3,745 more parents
attended parent/teacher conferences in 1986-87 than in the year preceding the imple-
mentation of the SRP. See Dowell v. Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1516-
17 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
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dents in the school system's elementary schools. 74 In February,
1985, the plaintiffs sought to reopen the case. 75
The district court eventually found that demographic changes
made the Finger Plan unworkable and that the school district had
bussed students for more than a decade in good-faith compliance
with the court's orders. 76 The district court also found that the
Board did not promote residential segregation and that the present
residential segregation in Oklahoma City was the result of private
decisionmaking and economics. It was, therefore, too attenuated to
be a vestige of former school segregation.77 The district court fur-
ther held that the previous injunctive decree should be vacated and
the school district returned completely to local control.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that "an injunction takes
on a life of its own and becomes an edict quite independent of the
law it is meant to effectuate."' 78 The Tenth Circuit approached the
case "not so much as one dealing with desegregation, but as one
dealing with the proper application of the federal law on injunctive
remedies."' 79 Relying on United States v. Swift & Co., 8 0 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that a desegregation decree remains in effect until a school
district can show "grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions [and] dramatic changes in conditions unforseen at the
time of the decree that ... impose extreme and unexpectedly op-
pressive hardships on the obligor."8' The court held that the Board
of Education failed to meet this burden; therefore the desegregation
decree remained in effect.
74 Under the SRP, at least 96.9% of the students in 11 of the 64 elementary schools
would be black. This amounted to 44% of the African-American children in grades K
through four. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 641 (Marshall, J. dissenting). At least 90% of the
students in 22 other schools would be non-African-Americans. The remaining 31
schools would be racially mixed. Id The SRP did not affect faculty and staff integration.
Id at 634.
75 The district court concluded that the principles of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel prohibited the plaintiffs from challenging the district court's 1977 findings that
the school system was "unitary." Dowell, 606 F. Supp. at 1548. Since unitariness had
been achieved, the district court concluded that court-ordered desegregation should
come to an end. The Tenth Circuit reversed. Dowell, 795 F. 2d 1516, cert. den. 479 U.S.
938 (1986). It held that nothing in the 1977 order indicated that the 1972 injunction
itself was terminated, even though the order's unitary finding was binding upon the
parties. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the finding that the system was "unitary"
merely ended the district court's active supervision of the case. Since the school district
was still subject to the desegregation decree, the respondents could challenge the SRP.
The case was remanded to the district court to determine if the desegregation decree
should be lifted or modified.
76 677 F. Supp. 1503 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
77 Id at 1512-13.
78 890 F. 2d 1483, 1490 (10th. Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
79 Id. at 1486.
80 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
81 890 F.2d at 1490 (citations omitted).
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In the majority opinion, written by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court held that the Tenth Circuit's reliance on Swift was
mistaken.8 2 The Court noted that the test given by the court of ap-
peals would subject a school district to judicial supervision for an
indefinite future. Such a draconian result could not be justified by
the principles governing the entry and dissolution of injunctive de-
crees, nor the commands of the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court emphasized that a school desegregation decree is warranted
only as a temporary measure. The decree is intended to displace
local decisiomaking authority until transition to a unitary nonracial
system of public education is achieved.83
[A] finding by the District Court that the Oklahoma City School
District was being operated in compliance with the commands of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that it was unlikely that the school board would return to its former
ways, would be a finding that the purposes of the desegregation
litigation had been fully achieved.8 4
The Court also indicated that a desegregation decree is dissolved
after the local authorities have operated in compliance with it for a
reasonable period of time.8 5
The Court remanded the case to the district court, with instruc-
tions for the District Court to determine:
whether the Board made a sufficient showing of constitutional
compliance as of 1985, when the SRP was adopted, to allow the
injunction to be dissolved. The District Court should address it-
self to whether the Board had complied in good faith with the
desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the ves-
tiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent
practicable.8 6
To provide further direction, as to what factors lower courts
should consider in determining whether or not a school system has
82 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636-37. Justice Marshall wrote a vigorous dissent in which
Justices Stevens and Blackmunjoined. For a discussion ofJustice Marshall's dissent, see
infra notes 131 to 135 and accompanying text.
83 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
84 Id. at 636-37 (emphasis added).
85 Id. at 637.
86 On remand, the district court held: (1) that the school board had complied in
good faith with initial desegregation decree from time it was entered until adoption of
neighborhood school plan; (2) that there was no indication that school board would
return to system of de jure segregation in the future; (3) that the vestiges of past dis-
crimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable; (4) that the Board was enti-
tled to complete dissolution of the initial decree; and (5) that the neighborhood school
system was adopted for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons in compliance with appli-
cable equal protection principles. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs., 778
F. Supp. 1144 (1991).
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eliminated the vestiges of de jure segregation, the Supreme Court
cited its 1968 opinion in Green v. New Kent County School Board.87 In
considering whether the vestiges of de jure segregation had been
eliminated as far as practicable, the District Court should look not
only at student assignments, but 'to every facet of school opera-
tions' ... 'existing policy and practice with regard to faculty, staff,
transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities' are 'among
the most important indicia of a segregated system' (the "Green
Factors").88
The respondents also contended that the appellate court held that
the district court's finding that residential segregation in Oklahoma
City was the result of private decisionmaking and economics and too
attenuated to be a vestige of the former school segregation was
clearly erroneous. The Court concluded, however, that the Tenth
Circuit's finding on this point is at least ambiguous. To dispel any
doubt, the Court directed that the district court and the appellate
court treat this issue as res nova.89
Finally, the Court stated that once a school system had elimi-
nated the vestiges of de jure segregation, the school system no
longer requires court authorization for the promulgation of policies
and rules regulating matters such as assignment of students.90
Challenges to subsequent actions by school boards, including those
related to student reassignments, should be evaluated by the equal
protection principles articulated in Washington v. Davis91 and Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.92
B. Freeman v. Pitts
In Dowell, the district court had relinquished all remedial con-
trol over the Oklahoma City School System. By contrast, in Freeman
v. Pitts, the district court had determined that control could be relin-
quished only over those aspects of the system in which the vesitiges
of the prior discriminatory conduct had been eradicated. The dis-
trict court retained supervisory authority over the aspects of the
school system that were not in full compliance. Dekalb County
School System ("DCSS") is located in a suburban area outside of
Atlanta, Georgia. In 1968, African-American school children and
their parents instituted a class action. After the suit was filed, DCSS
worked out a comprehensive desegregation plan with the Depart-
87 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
88 Dowell, 11 S. Ct. at 638 (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 435).
89 Ia- at 638 n.2.
90 IE at 638.
91 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
92 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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ment of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"). The district
court approved the proposed plan and entered a consent order in
June, 1969. Under the plan, all of the former dejure black schools
in DCSS were closed and their students were reassigned to the re-
maining neighborhood schools. The district court found that DCSS
was desegregated for a short period of time under this court-or-
dered plan.
According to the Court, between 1969-86, respondents sought
infrequent and limited judicial intervention.93 In 1969, African-
Americans consisted of only 5.6% of the student body of DCSS. By
1986, however, their percentage had increased to 47%. The popu-
lation in Dekalb County grew significantly between 1969 and 1986.
Whites migrated to the northern part of the county while African-
Americans migrated to the southern part. By the 1986-87 school
year, a significant amount of racial imbalance in student school as-
signments existed in DCSS. Over half of the African-American stu-
dents attended schools that were over 90% black and 62% of them
attended schools where more than 67% of the students were black
(20% more than the systemwide average). Of the white students
enrolled in DCSS, 27% attended schools that were over 90% white
and 59% of them attended schools where the percentage of white
students exceeded 20% of the systemwide average of white
students.
Despite this amount of racial imbalance in the schoools, in 1986
the School Board filed a motion for final dismissal of the litigation.
The district court examined whether DCSS had complied with the
Green Factors. In addition to the Green Factors, the district court also
considered whether the quality of education being offered to white
and black students was equal. Even though there was significant ra-
cial imbalance in student assignments, the district court found that
DCSS was unitary, not only with regard to student assignments but
also in the areas of transportation, physical facilities, and extracur-
ricular activities. 94 The district court concluded that the racial im-
balance of the students was attributable to the rapid demographic
shifts that had occurred in DeKalb County and other factors. The
court did not attibute the imbalance to the prior unconstitutional
conduct of DCSS.95 The district court, however, concluded that
93 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1437. They did not request significant changes in student
attendance zones or student assignment policies. In 1976, DCSS was ordered to expand
its majority to minority ("M-to-M') plan, to establish a biracial committee to oversee the
transfer program, and to reassign teachers so that the ratio of black and white teachers
would be similar in each school. Id.
94 Id. at 1442.
95 Id. at 1440. The district court examined the interaction between DCSS policy
and the demographic changes in Dekalb County. Of the 170 changes made by DCSS,
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vestiges of the dual system remained in the areas of teacher and
principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality of educa-
tion.96 Further relief was ordered in these areas.
The appellate court rejected the district court's incremental ap-
proach to eliminating vesitiges of prior dejure conduct. It held that
the district court had erred in considering the six Green Factors as
separate categories.97 In order for a school system to achieve uni-
tary status it must satisfy all of the Green Factors for several years.98
Since DCSS had not done this, the court of appeals held that DCSS
was responsible for the current racial imbalance and had to correct
that imbalance. 99
In a majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, the
Supreme Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the
Green Factors could be considered separately and that partial relin-
quishment of supervision and control of a school system in an ap-
propriate case does not offend the Consitution: 00
only 3 were found to have had a partial segregative effect, and that effect was considered
minor. The district court concluded that DCSS achieved the maximum practical
desegreation. It found that the existing segregation of students attributable to demo-
graphic shifts that were inevitable as the result of suburbanization, the decline in the
number of children born to white families, blockbusting of formerly white neighbor-
hoods, which lead to selling and buying of real estate in the DeKalb area on a highly
dynamic basis, and the completion of Interstate 20, which made access from DeKalb
County into the City of Atlanta much easier. Id. at 1440.
96 The district court found that, while there had not been any intentional segrega-
tion, DCSS had not maintained a ratio of black to white teachers and administrators in
each school approximate to the ratio of black to white teachers and administrators
throughout the system. Black principals and administrators were over represented in
schools with high percentages of black students and underrepresented in schools with
low percentages of black students. In addition, teachers in white schools tended to be
better educated and have more experience than their couterparts in schools with dispro-
portionately high percentages of black students. Moreover, per pupil expenditures in
majority white schools exceeded those in majority black schools. Id. at 1441.
97 887 F.2d at 1446 (1986).
98 .887 F.2d at 1446.
99 Id at 1448.
100 Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and by Justices
White, Souter, and Scalia. Justices Scalia and Souter wrote separate concurring opi-
nons. For a discussion of Scalia's concurrence, see infra note 119.
Justice Souter notes that the opinion of the Court indicated that judicial control of
student and faculty assignments may still be necessary to remedy the persisting vestiges
of a dual system. He writes separately, however, to note two additional situations in
which continued judicial control may be necessary. The first situation is when the demo-
graphic change toward segregated residential patterns is itself caused by past school
segregation. The second situation occurs after the district relinquishes supervision over
a remedied aspect, and future imbalance in that remedied aspect is caused by remaining
vestiges of the dual system. In other words, the vestige of discrimination in one aspect
becomes the incubator for resegregation in others. Justice Souter discusses the poten-
tial that segregated faculties could send whites and blacks into schools based on faculty
race and, as a result, increase segregation along those lines. Therefore, even though the
student assignment problem has been remedied, it is possible that segreation of stu-
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We hold that, in the course of supervising desgregation plans,
federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and
control of school districts in incremental stages, before full com-
pliance has been achieved in every area of school operations....
[U]pon a finding that a school system subject to a court-super-
vised desegregation plan is in compliance in some but not all ar-
eas, the court in appropriate cases may return control to the
school system in those areas where compliance has been achieved,
limiting futher judicial supervision to operations that are not yet
in full compliance with the court decree. In particular, the district
court may determine that it will not order further remedies in the
area of student assignments where racial imbalance is not tracea-
ble in a proximate way to constitutional violations.1 0 1
The Court noted a number of factors that are to be considered in
determining whether partial withdrawl is warranted. First, whether
there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the court decree
in those aspects of the system where supervision is being with-
drawn.10 2 Second, whether retention ofjudicial control is necessary
or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets
of the school system.10 3 Finally, whether the school district has
demonstrated, to the public and to the parents and students of the
once disfavored race, its good faith commitment to the whole of the
dents could be the result of people being moved to the schools where the faculty were
segregated. Consequently, before a district court ends its supervision of student assign-
ments, it should make a finding that there is no immediate threat of unremedied Green-
type factors causing population or student enrollment changes that, in turn, may imbal-
ance student composition. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (Souter, J., concurring).
In his concurrence, Blackmun agreed with what he considered to be the holding of
the Court, that in some circumstances a district court need not interfere with a particular
portion of a school system while retaining jurisdiction over the entire system. He also
agreed that the good faith of the school board is relevant when inquiring about the
elimination of the vestiges of state imposed segregation. Finally he agreed that DCSS
must balance student assignments if an imbalance is traceable to unlawful state policy
and if such an order is necessary to fashion an effective remedy.
He wrote separately to address three issues: to explain what it means for the district
court to retain jurisdiction over a part of the case while relinquishing supervision and
control over a subpart of the school system; to elaborate on the factors the District
Court should consider in determiming whether racial imbalance is traceable to the
board actions; and to indicate where it failed to apply these standards. According to
Blackmun, DCSS simply cannot assert that demographic changes caused racial iden-
tifiablility of the schools. It must establish that its own policies did not contribute to
racial imbalance. According to Blackmun, the available evidence suggests that this
would be a difficult burden for DCSS to meet. Id. at 1455-60 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in judgment).
101 Id. at 1445-46. Kennedy notes that this position was the actual position the
Court took in Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
102 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446.
103 Id.
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court's decree and to those provisions of the law and constitution
that were the predicate forjudcicial intervention in the first place. 10 4
The major issue in this case was whether the district court was
correct in releasing its control over student assignments. The Court
notes:
racial balance is not to be acheived for its own sake. It is to be
pursed when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional
violation. Once the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation
has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy
imbalance that is caused by demographic factors .... 105
Much of the remaining discussion in the Court's opinion relates
to whether existing student segregation could be attributable either
to private decisionmaking or to the original constitutional violation
and subsequent action by the state.10 6 The Court's analysis turns on
the belief that the existing student segregation is the result of resi-
dential segregation.10 7 As a result, it is necessary to inquire into the
basis of residential segregation. If the residential segregation can
be traced to factors other than the state's attempt to fix or alter
demographic patterns, then the residential segregation is not tracea-
ble to state action.
The Court notes that our society is very moblile.'0 8 Given the
disparate preferences between blacks and whites with respect to the
racial mix of neighborhoods, it is unlikely that racially stable neigh-
borhoods will emerge.' 0 9 Where resegregation is the product of
private choices, the Court concludes that it does not have consitu-
tional implications.
It is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of fed-
eral courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and mas-
sive demographic shifts. To attempt such results would require
onging and never-ending supervision by the courts of school dis-
tricts simply because they were once dejure segregated." 10
104 Id.
105 Id at 1447. The Court quotes from its opinion in Swann. In the absence of a
showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliber-
ately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns affecting the racial composition of
the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary. Id. (quoting
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971)).
106 Id. at 1447-50.
107 Id- at 1448.
108 "In one year (from 1987 to 1988) over 40 million Americans, or 17.6% of the
total population, moved households. Over a third of those people moved to a different
county and over six million migrated between States." Id. at 1447-48 (citing U.S. DEPT.
OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES 19,
table 25 (11th ed. 1991)).
109 According to court evidence, African-Americans prefer a 50%-50% neighbor-
hood racial mix, while whites prefer a mix of 80% white and 20% black. Id. at 1448.
110 Id.
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As time is put between the original violation and the present, these
demographic changes intervene, and hence, a new justification
emerges for the continued separation of blacks and whites in public
schools.
The Court's opinion also considered whether judicial control
over student attendance was necessary to achieve compliance with
other facets of the school system. "' Racial balancing of student as-
signments may be a legitimate remedial device to correct other fun-
damental inequities that were themselves caused by the
constitutional violation. The Court notes that there was no showing
that racial balancing was an appropriate mechanism to cure those
aspects of the school system not in compliance at the time the dis-
trict court released supervision of student assignments. 1 2 The case
was remanded so that the district court could make specific findings
on whether it was necessary to retain control over student assign-
ments in order to accomplish compliance in the areas. 1 3 The Court
noted that the district court did not address the Dowell issue regard-
ing the good faith compliance by the school district with court order
over a reasonable period of time.
A history of good-faith compliance is evidence that any current
racial imbalance is not the product of a new dejure violation and
enables the district court to accept the school board's representa-
tion that it has accepted the principle of racial equality and will
not suffer intentional discrimination in the future." 14
The case was also remanded for the district court to determine
whether the school district complied, in good faith, with the entirety
of the desegregation plan. 1 5
C. Implications of Dowell and Freeman
For purposes of determining the elimination of all or part of the
vestiges of the prior de jure conduct, the Court requires lower
courts to examine the Green Factors, which represent observable ra-
cial balance. Both Dowell and Freeman, however, suggest that racial
imbalance may not be the primary consideration. In Dowell, the
Court accepted the possibility that, after a desegregation decree is
dissolved, current residential segregation can justify subsequent
resegregation of students. In Freeman, the Court accepted the possi-
bility that the vestiges of prior de jure conduct can be elimintated
111 Id. at 1449.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1449-50.
115 Id. at 1450.
DEJURE SEGREGATION
even if a significant amount of student racial imbalance exists at the
time of such a determination.
As a result, what may be more important than the existence of
racial imbalance are the intangible considerations related to deter-
mining the meaning behind that racial imbalance. The Court re-
quires lower courts to examine the conduct of school officials during
the desegregation process and to attach a meaning to residential
segregation. It appears to be the meaning attached to racial imbal-
ance, rather than its existence, that is dispositive of the issue regard-
ing the continued existence of the vestiges of the prior conduct.
In both cases, the Court noted that, as a prerequisite to the ter-
mination of all or part of court supervision, school districts should
comply in good faith with the court decree for a reasonable period
of time.1 16 The Court also noted the importance of determining if a
school system will return to engaging in intentionally discriminatory
practices.1 17 Good faith compliance and assurances that the school
system will not return to its former discriminatory ways are actually
examinations that are directed towards interpreting the sincerity of
the school district in eradicating de jure segregation. The Court is
asking the school district to show that its attitude towards African-
Americans, and hence the meaning attached to its actions affecting
them, has changed. In other words, the district must prove that it is
no longer acting under an assumption that African-Americans are
inferior when it formulates its policies and programs.
Perhaps the most complex issue in determining whether court
supervision should be released, in whole or in part, is the existence
of current residential segregation. Prior to Dowell, the Supreme
Court had not addressed whether residential segregation could be
considered a vestige of operating a dual school system. 118 Both
Dowell and Freeman require an examination into the causes of current
residential segregation in order to determine whether it is the result
of private decision making or state action. "The principal cause of
racial and ethnic imbalance in ... public schools across the coun-
try-North and South-is the imbalance in residential patterns. "19
116 It at 1446, 1449-50; Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637-38. In his concurring opinion in
Freeman,Justice Blackmun also agreed that the good faith of the school board is relevant
in inquiries about eliminating vestiges of state-imposed segregation. 112 S. Ct. at 1455.
117 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446; Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636-37.
118 See Drew S. Days III, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody
Laughing?, 95 Y.a LJ. 1737, 1761 (1986) (reviewing PAUL R. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING:
INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION (1985) (stating that Dimond's book pro-
vides a compelling rebuttal to those who claim that residential segregation is the result
of purely advantageous events)).
119 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States,
429 U.S. 990, 994 (1976) (PowellJ., concurring)). In addition to joining the opinion of
the Court, Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion. Scalia criticized the
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Residential segregation is a way of life in the United States and is
likely to remain so for sometime. 120 Hence, the Court's resolution,
of how to treat current residential segregation, is likely to have
profound implications for the termination of existing school deseg-
regation decrees.
Residential segregation is the result of many diverse influences.
Discrimination by private parties, as well as private individuals act-
ing upon their own social and economic reasons, contributes to resi-
dential segregation.1 2 1 Residential segregation is also, in part, the
result of discriminatory activities by nonschool governmental au-
thorities at the federal, state, and local level. Prior actions by gov-
ernmental authorities have obviously impacted on the amount of
residential segregation that exists in the United States today. In the
past, local authorities often prohibited integrated neighborhoods
Court because it did not articulate an easily applicable test to determine whether resi-
dential segregation is the result of public or private action. He notes that racially im-
balanced schools resulting from residential segregation are the result of a blend of
public and private actions. As a result, it is impossible to separate what part is public
and what part is private. The attempt to do so is only guesswork. He argues for a stan-
dard to residential segregation that if school boards adopt plans allowing for neighbor-
hood schools and for free choice of other schools (transportation paid), then the
constitutional violation with respect to students should be considered remedied.
Whatever racial imbalances such a free-choice system might produce would be the prod-
uct of private forces. Id at 1452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
120 See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 50-51, 54-55 (1978); Frank deLeeuw et
al., Housing, in THE URBAN PREDICAMENT 119, 145-55 (William Gorham & Nathan Glazer
eds., 1976); Reynolds Farley, Residential Segregation and its Implications for School Integration,
in THE COURTS, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 164, 169 (Betsy Levin &
Willis D. Hawley eds., 1975). But see Albert I. Hermalin & Reynolds Farley, The Potential
for Residential Integration in Cities and Suburbs: Implications for the Busing Controversy, 38 AM.
Soc. REV. 595, 605-08 (1973).
According to evidence in Freeman, African-Americans prefer a 50%-50% neighbor-
hood racial mix, while whites prefer a mix of 80% white and 20% black. Freeman, 112 S.
Ct. at 1448. As a result, the natural tendency of each group seeking to live in integrated
housing, which they define as preferable, will invariably pull in the direction of
resegregation.
121 In Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, Justice Powell said that housing separation of
the races resulted from purely natural and neutral nonstate causes. 413 U.S. 189, 249
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Presumably what Powell
meant was that housing segregation was the result of private choices. Former Chief
Justice Burger and current Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred with Powell in Austin,
where Powell wrote, "[e]conomic pressures and voluntary preferences are the primary
determinants of residential patterns." Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429
U.S. 990, 994 (1976).
See also W. A. V. Clark, Residential Segregation in American Cities: A Review and Interpreta-
tion, 5 POPULATION RES. & POL'y REV. 95-127 (1986). The United States Commission on
Civil Rights appointed Dr. Clark to conduct a study and present his findings on the
causes of residential segregation. He concluded that the following factors influence resi-
dential segregation today: (1) economics and housing affordability; (2) personal prefer-
ences and social relationships; (3) urban structure; and (4) private discrimination.
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through the use of city ordinances, 22 zoning practices, 123 and seg-
regated public housing. 124 Racial discrimination by state authorities
existed in the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.1 25 Fed-
eral authorities contributed to segregated housing by requiring that
houses qualifying for federal mortgage insurance programs have ra-
cially restrictive covenants. 126
Residential segregation is also, in part, a product of the opera-
tion of a dual school system.' 27 Over twenty years ago, ChiefJustice
Burger noted that people gravitate toward school facilities. Just as
schools are located in response to the needs of people, the location
of schools may also influnece residential patterns. t28 Moreover,
school officials may have engaged in such deliberate acts as racial
assignments of students, faculty, and staff, and of drawing school
boundaries in an effort to increase racial polarization in the
neighborhoods.
As the Court approached the issue of how to treat residential
segregation, it was given the opportunity of choosing between Jus-
tice Marshall's position in his dissent in Dowell,129 and Justice
Scalia's position in his concurring opinion in Freeman.'30 These po-
sitions represent the extremes of regarding how to treat residential
segregation. Marshall's opinion notes the role that the State, local
officials, and the Board of Education played in creating the self-
122 See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City, 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1160 (W.D.
Okla. 1991).
123 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
124 See, e.g., PAUL R. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN
SEGREGATION (1985). The author talks about residential segregation and about govern-
ment culpability in creating it. He uses Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), as a
primary case, supplemented by shorter discussions of Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975) and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
125 It was not until 1948 that the Supreme Court struck down racially restrictive
covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
126 The Federal Housing Administration required the assertion of racially restricted
covenants in all properties which received FHA insurance until 1949. DIMOND, supra
note 124, at 184.
127 The Supreme Court noted the interrelationship and possibility, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., that the location of schools may influence the pat-
terns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have an important impact
on the composition of inner-city neighborhoods. 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971); see Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Renick, 443 U.S. 449, 465, n.13 (1979); DIMOND, supra note 124, at
56-59 (arguing that school boards' actions help create segregated neighborhoods be-
cause families tend to move near the schools that their school age children attend).
128 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971). The
Court also notes that discriminatory school assignment polices "may well promote seg-
regated residential patterns which, when combined with 'neighborhood zoning,' further
lock the school system into the mold of separation of the races." Id. at 21.
129 111 S. Ct. at 639-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130 112 S. Ct. at 1450-54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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perpetuating patterns of residential segregation.' 3 l In the Dowell
case on remand, for example, the district court noted that residen-
tial segregation in Oklahoma City was originally enforced by an
Oklahoma City ordinance that specified the areas in which blacks
and whites were to live.' 3 2 African-Americans today are still the pri-
mary residents in the areas originally ceded to them, even though
the Oklahoma Supreme court declared the ordinance unconsitu-
tional in 1935.133 Marshall, therefore, took the position that current
residential segregation was a vestige of prior de jure conduct be-
cause state action resulted in self-perpetuating patterns of residen-
tial segregation. 3 4 For Marshall, desegregation decrees would
remain in effect when it was clear that their removal would result in
a significant number of racially identifiable schools due to residen-
tial segregation that could otherwise be prevented.' 35
By contrast, Scalia, in Freeman, argued that it is impossible to
determine what part of residential segregation is traceable to public
action and what part is private. Moreover, the attempt to do so is
only guesswork.' 36 To address residential segregation, Scalia pro-
posed that if school boards adopt plans that allow for neighborhood
schools and for free choice of other schools (transportation paid),
then the vestiges of the prior discriminatory conduct with respect to
students should be considered remedied. Whatever racial imbal-
ances that a free-choice system might produce would be deemed the
product of private forces.' 3 7
In Freeman, the Court rejected both of these positions and in-
stead sought a middle ground. The Court's treatment of the resi-
dential segregation issue once again shows the importance that the
Court places not upon the existence of segregation, but rather upon
the meaning attached to it. 138 The Court, in effect, is forcing lower
131 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 646 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As I understand the use of the
term "self-perpetuating patterns of residential segregation," Justice Marshall is refer-
ring to residential segregation. It does not matter whether the character of segregated
neighborhoods was created recently with the movement of one racial group out of a
given area and the movement of another racial group into that area, or whether the
segregated neighborhood is one of long standing duration. What is important is the
existence of segregated residential patterns.
132 Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1160 (W.D.
Okla. 1991).
133 Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P.2d 1054 (1935).
134 778 F. Supp. at 1160; Allen v. Oklahoma City, 52 P.2d 1054 (1935).
135 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'37 Id
138 Such a position is consistent with the Court's opinion in Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). The Spangler Court held that, once a school
district implements a racially neutral attendance plan for students, a district court can-
not require continued adjustments to maintain a certain amount of desegregation. Id at
434-35. The Court concluded that the subsequent resegregation of students was not
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courts to put a meaning on existing residential segregation. 3 9 If
they determine that residential segregation is not caused by inten-
tional governmental action, then the existence of segregated
schools that results from residential segregation conveys a different
meaning, and hence inculcates a different message about the racial
imbalance that exists in public schools.
Racially imbalanced neighborhood schools that are the product
of private residential decision making are not based upon de jure
segregation's assumption of African-American inferiority. Such
schools are based upon legitimate educational and community ben-
efits derived from neighborhood schools. Neighborhood schools
minimize the safety hazards to childern in traveling to school, re-
duce the cost of transporting students, ease pupil placement and
administrative costs through easily determined student assignment
policies, and increase communication between the family and the
school.' 40 The School Board of Oklahoma City specifically argued
that its primary reasons for adopting the SRP were to increase pa-
rental involvement and to increase the level of community involve-
ment and support in the schools. By achieving greater parental
involvement, neighborhood schools improve the academic environ-
ment for students in those schools.
III
THE PURPOSE OF REMEDIES FOR DE JURE SEGREGATION
The Court's termination cases show that it is not the elimina-
tion of racial imbalance that is the determining factor in eradicating
the vestiges of de jure segregation. Just as a school system could
have de facto segregation and not be in violation of the Constitu-
tion, a school system can eliminate the vestigies of its prior discrimi-
natory conduct, even though racial imbalance or the potential for a
significant increase in racial imbalance exists at the time that the de-
termination is made. The Court has determined that the meaning
behind the separation of black and white school children is the most
important element, both in determining a constitutional violation
and its remedy. By understanding this, we can now put the reme-
dies that the Supreme Court has approved for the harm of de jure
segregation into proper perspective.
part of the original constitutional violation that the district court had authority to rem-
edy. Id. at 435-37. Rather, the subsequent resegregation "apparently resulted from
people randomly moving into, out of, and around the [school district] area." Id at 435-
36.
139 I do not wish to suggest that this is an easy distinction to make.
140 See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 60 (6th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967).
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Measures approved by the Supreme Court to remedy the harm
resulting from de jure segregation in public schools include reme-
dial reading, in-service teacher training, testing programs, and
counseling and career guidance programs. 14' School desegregation
has been the principal means approved by the Supreme Court to
remedy the harm resulting from de jure segregation. 142 It is my
contention that what the Supreme Court did in its de jure segrega-
tion opinions-as opposed to what it said in those opinions-is con-
sistent with recognizing the primary harm of dejure segregation as
allowing the socializing process of public schools to inculcate the
invidious value.
A. Desegregation as the Principal Means to Remedy the Harm
The Court has pursued school desegregation at times vigor-
ously and at times cautiously. 143 A number of remedies have been
used to accomplish desegregation, including student reassignment,
redrawing attendance zones, funding academic improvement pro-
grams at various schools, and the use of magnet schools. Yet, de-
segregation is, no doubt, thought to address concerns that go far
beyond the mere racial composition of public elementary and secon-
dary schools. 144
While the meaning attached to segregation is the invidious
value, the physical, separation of children is its most visible compo-
nent. The only method to eliminate this distortion of the socializing
process is to dismantle the dual school system. 145 Absent such a
step, the original meaning that led to the racial separation of stu-
dents will continue to exist.
The remedy for de jure segregation of public education there-
fore differs from the remedy for segregation of other public facilities
or services because, in a constitutional sense, the harm is different.
In most contexts, the primary harm of segregation is stigma. In
public elementary and secondary education, however, the inculca-
tion of invidious values is the primary harm. While desegregation is
141 See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1977).
142 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green
v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
143 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Pasadena City Bd.
of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
144 In Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 666 (10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that "[i]n so defining 'unitariness,' we recognize that racial balance in the
schools is no more the goal to be attained than is racial imbalance the evil to be
remedied."
145 Dismantling of the dual school system is an important aspect in the goal of reme-
dying de jure segregation of public schools. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449 (1979); Swann, 402 U.S. at 1; Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
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not necessary to eliminate the stigmatic effects of segregation in
other contexts, 146 it is necessary in the context of public elementary
and secondary education. Since public elementary and secondary
schools are transmitters of societal values to the young, remedies for
de jure segregation therein become sui generis in anti-discrimination
law.
Just as the physical separation of students was not the harm re-
sulting from dejure segregation, mere physical integration in public
elementary and secondary schools is not the remedy. 147 The pri-
mary harm was allowing the socializing process of schools to instill a
belief in the inferiority of African-Americans. The remedy is there-
fore the elimination of this invidious value inculcation.
B. Educational Improvements as a Means of Remedying the
Harm
Measures requiring educational improvements have been incor-
porated into many desegregation decrees. 48 Court-ordered aca-
demic programs are consistent with eliminating invidious value
inculcation if they serve one of three overlapping purposes: (1)
eliminating historic underfunding in schools that continue to be ra-
cially identifiable; (2) promoting desegregation; or (3) specifically
addressing invidious value inculcation within the traditional educa-
tional program. If the academic program, however, serves only aca-
demic purposes, then such remedies would fall outside of the ambit
of the theory articulated in this Article.
As noted above, part of the original harm of dejure segregation
in most jurisdictions included the systematic underfunding of public
schools attended by African-Americans. When courts are able to
desegregate a school district, the individual schools lose their racial
identity, thus making academic measures unnecessary as a means for
remedying systematic underfunding of African-American schools. 149
146 Professor Yudof has pointed out this criticism. See Yudof, supra note 19, at 106.
147 Mark G. Yudof, Implementing Desegregation Decrees, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGRE-
GATON 245 (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981); see also Keyes, 895 F.2d. at 666.
148 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279-88 (1977) (Milliken II); Oliver v.
Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 787 (6th Cir. 1980); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530
F.2d 401, 427-30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. White v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 935 (1976);
Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 741-43 (N.D. Tex. 1981); United States v Board of
Sch. Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. 657, 671-72 (S.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, rev. in part, 637
F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Buckley, 449 U.S. 838
(1980); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351, 357 (E.D. Mo. 1980) aff'd 667 F.2d
643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Caldwell v. Missouri, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
149 68.3% of the students attending Kansas City public schools were African-
American when the district court approved the massive Milliken II educational programs.
See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 36 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). The court also found that the qualitative
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In situations where courts find it difficult to desegregate all of
the schools in a district, 150 funding of academic measures, which are
aimed at equalizing resources for all schools in a given school dis-
trict, is a reasonable means to alleviate this aspect of invidious value
inculcation.1-5  Ordering the most extensive academic remedies, the
district court in Jenkins v. Missouri15 2 noted that it was not possible to
desegregate successfilly Kansas City's schools. 153 In ordering mas-
sive capital expenditures, the district court said that the school
buildings and physical facilities in the Kansas City Metropolitan
School District had "literally rotted."' 54 A portion of the academic
and quantitative ratings of the other schools in the surrounding metropolitan area were
higher than those of Kansas City. Id. at 26.
15o When it amplified guidelines for desegregation decrees in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court allowed for the possib-
lity of some single race schools. Id at 25-26.
151 In Atlanta, for example, the demographics prevented substantial desegregation
because there were not enough white students for desegregation to become a reality. In
1973, a compromise gave African-Americans control of the predominantly African-
American Atlanta school district. The school district received both financial backing to
implement an ambitious eductional enrichment program and the power to set its own
tax rate without having to resort to a public referendum. See Roy Brooks, Racial Subordi-
nation Through Formal Equal Opportunity, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 881, 952 n.306 (1988).
152 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (The
Supreme Court reviewed only on the power of federal courts to increase local and state
taxes in order to fund the remedy). As one judge stated,
[t]he remedies ordered go far beyond anything previously seen in a
school desegregation case. The sheer immensity of the programs encom-
passed by the district court's order-the large number of magnet schools
and the quantity of capital renovations and new construction-are con-
cededly without parallel in any other school district in the country.
855 F.2d at 1318-19 (Bowman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
153 The record indicated that in 1985, 68.3% of the students in the Kansas City
Missouri School of District ("KCMSD") were black. The district court found that the
preponderance of black students in KCMSD was due to the State of Missouri and
KCMSD's constitutional violations, which caused "white flight." Without regaining
those students who have already fled, the court of appeals noted that any meaningful
integration was not possible. The court of appeals took notice of the census figures
regarding the percentage of children in Kansa City, even though its boundaries were not
coterminous with the KCMSD. But according to 1980 census figures, blacks accounted
for only 37% of the children between the ages of 5 and 18 in Kansas City. Idt at 1302.
154 Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1987), modified on other
grounds, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), aft'd, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
The district court ordered a number of expensive educational programs. One was a
magnet schools program, which provided by 1991-92 every high school and middle
school in Kansas City, Missouri School District and half of the elementary schools would
become magnet schools, with one or more distinctive themes, such as foreign languages,
performing arts, and math and science. According to the district court, the costs of the
principal orders instituting the magnet schools plan were $12,972,727 for the June 16,
1986 order and $142,736,025 for the November 12, 1986 order. 855 F.2d at 1301. The
district court also ordered a capital improvements program totaling some $260 million.
This program called for the closing of 18 school facilities, the construction of 17 new
facilities, and renovation of others. Id. at 1301. The district court found that the capital
improvement program was necessary in part because the unconstitutional segregation
was in part responsible for the decay of KCMSD's buildings. Id. at 1304-05. There is a
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remedies ordered by the Jenkins court can be understood in terms of
alleviating both the historic underfunding of the education of
African-Americans and the invidious values it instills.
The underfunding aspect of invidious value inculcation is likely
to become extremely relevant as school systems attempt to termi-
nate their school desegregation decrees. The district court in Free-
man found itself faced with terminating student assignments even
though a substantial number of racially identifiable schools existed
in DeKalb County. 155 The Freeman court concluded that the racial
imbalance in those schools was not the result of invidious intent by
public authorities. Therefore, such segregation did not inculcate
the invidious value. In addition to the Green Factors, the district
court also determined that the quality of education was one of the
issues in determining whether DCSS had eliminated the vestigies of
its prior de jure conduct. The district court found that DCSS was
not in compliance in this area and ordered further relief.156
Even though the existence of racial imbalance may be explaina-
ble without reference to the invidious value, that value can neverthe-
less still be inculcated when the educational quality of schools
attended by African-Americans is inferior to that of schools at-
tended by whites. For a district court to terminate its supervision in
a situation where the quality of education to African-American stu-
dents is not equal to that provided to Caucasian students clearly
means that invidious value inculcation continues to exist. Unlike
residential segregation, inequities in school quality are completely
under the control of the school district; therefore, explanations that
do not rest upon an assumption of African-American inferiority will
be difficult to make.
In addition to academic remedies ordered to allievate system-
atic underfunding, many lower courts have ordered the design and
implementation of magnet schools as a means of furthering deseg-
regation.' 5 7 This method has been approved by the the Supreme
long history in the State of Missouri of underfunding the education of African-American
children. For a discussion of this history, see Kevin Little, Missouri v.Jenkins: Exploring
the Judicial Limits of the Supremacy Clause, 8 HAmv. BLAcKLETrERJ. 137, 138-44 (1991).
155 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1441.
156 The district court found that teachers in schools with disproportionately high
percentages of white students tended to be better edcuated and have more experience
than their counterparts in schools with disproportionaely high percentages of African-
American students. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1442. In addition, the court found that per
pupil expenditures in majority white schools exceeded per pupil expernditures in major-
ity black schools. The district court ordered the school district to equalize spending and
remedy these problems. Id
157 See, e.g.,Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 495 U.S. 33
(1990) (approving a lower court order providing that half of the elementary schools
would become magnet schools); Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1117 (E.D.
Mich. 1975), aft'd, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), aft'd 433 U.S. 267 (1977). In a study of
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Court.158 Magnet school programs often require the initiation of
expensive programs to strengthen the academic curriculum of a few
schools. So long as the purpose of such programs is to further de-
segregation, they serve to disestablish invidious value inculcation. 59
Funding for some educational components are aimed directly at
the value-inculcating process. 160 These include programs designed
to eliminate racial bias in testing procedures, to counsel students
undergoing desegregation, and to train teachers. 161 Such programs
typically address elements of racial bias that exist within the tradi-
tional educational program.
Finally, some courts have approved remedies that serve a
purely academic role. In Milliken H, the Supreme Court gave its ap-
proval to such remedies when they are at the behest of local educa-
tional officials.' 62 The sole purpose of these remedies is to improve
the academic performance of African-American children. The prob-
lem with these programs is that they are directed toward alleviating
a defective condition of African-American students.163 While one of
the above justifications could explain the need for a given academic
program, merely singling out African-Americans for remedial care
(as opposed to changing the values being inculcated) is inconsistent
with the theory of this Article, which views the harm of de jure seg-
regation as an institutional one. 16'
C. Sui Generis Nature of the Remedy for De Jure Segregation
in the Context of Public Schools
Mandatory racial balancing of students as the principal means
to remedy the harm of de jure segregation in public schools repre-
sents a significant departure from the Court's remedies for de jure
39 urban school districts that had instituted desegregation plans, 80%a had used magnet
programs for desegregation purposes. Only half of those districts were implementing
mandatory busing plans. Desegregation Strategies Currently Used by Urban Districts, EDUC.
DAILY, Feb. 15, 1990, at 4.
A study conducted by the United States Department of Education found positive
results in 40%6 of the districts that developed magnet schools to affect districtwide de-
segregation. Id. at 295. Price & Stem, Magnet Schools as a Strategy for Integration and School
Reform, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 291, 294 (1987) (discussing the use of magnet schools as
a strategy for integration).
158 Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1667 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 272).
159 See supra note 157.
160 See supra notes 148-59.
161 For an extended discussion of the substance of these components, see, e.g.,
Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1139-44 (E.D. Mich. 1975), modified, 540 F.2d
229 (6th Cir. 1976), aft'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
162 Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 279.
163 My criticism of remedies for dejure segregation stems from this very notion. See
infra part IV.
164 See supra notes 35 to 56.
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segregation in other contexts. When confronted with dejure segre-
gation in public parks, 165 beaches, 166 golf courses, 167 transporta-
tion,168 and other public facilities, 169 the Court concluded only that
mandatory racial separation was impermissible. This departure can-
not be attributed solely to the remedial duty imposed to eliminate
dejure segregation when the rights of students as opposed to adults
are involved. For example, in Bazemore v. Friday,170 the Court re-
jected the argument that mandatory racial mixing of children was
necessary to eliminate the harm resulting from segregated 4-H clubs
that the state sponsored for children. Nor can this departure be att-
tibuted solely to the operation of an education system by the state.
In United States v. Fordice,171 the Court imposed a different remedial
duty for eradicating the harm of dejure segregation at the university
level than it did at the public school level.
The reason the remedies for dejure segregation of public edu-
cation-primarily desegregation-differ from the remedy for segre-
gation of other public facilities or services is because of the unique
purpose of public schools as compared to other governmental serv-
ices. Desegregation is necessary because it eliminates the most visi-
ble means in which to socialize the invidious value. While
desegregation is not necessary to eliminate the stigmatic effect of
segregation in other contexts, 172 it is necessary in the context of
public education, whose primary purpose is to transmit societal val-
ues to children.' 73 Remedies for de jure segregation in public ele-
mentary and secondary schools become sui generis in anti-
discrimination law.
1. Bazemore v. Friday-The Remedial Obligation to Eradicate the
Vestiges of Dejure Segregation for Children Outside of the
Public School Context
In Bazemore, the Supreme Court articulated the method for
eradicating the vestiges of de jure segregation involving the rights
165 New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per
curiam).
166 Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
167 Holmes v. Atlanta 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
168 Gayle v. Browder 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses).
169 Johnson v. Virginia 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (courtrooms); Turner v.
Memphis 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (municipal airports).
170 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
17' 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
172 Professor Yudof has pointed out this criticism. See Mark G. Yudof, Nondis-
crimnination and Beyond: The Search for Principle in Supreme Court Desegregation Decisions, in
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 97, 106 (Walter G. Stephan &Joe
R. Feagin eds., 1980).
173 See supra notes 14 to 34 and accompanying text.
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of children outside of the context of public schools. Prior to 1965
an agency of North Carolina had maintained segregated 4-H
clubs. 174 Even though the mandatory segregation policy was aban-
doned in 1965, fifteen years later 39% of the clubs remained all-
white, and 880 single race clubs (entirely black, white, or native
American) existed in racially mixed communities (a decline of 1.3%
from 1972).175 The Court held that it was not necessary to integrate
black and white children in 4-H clubs in order to eliminate the harm
produced by the prior de jure segregation of those clubs.
The Court rejected the notion, based on Green, that mandatory
racial mixing of children was necessary to eliminate the vestiges of
the harm resulting from the operation of segregated 4-H clubs
sponsored by the state. The Court argued that the choice to join a
4-H club is voluntary, while attendance at public schools is not. 176
As I have argued, 177 the Court's distinction between 4-H clubs in
Bazemore and public schools in Green is best explained by the distinc-
tion between the primary purposes of each institution.1 78 Unlike ed-
ucation in public schools, the purpose of these clubs was to
174 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 340 (Brennan, J., joined by all other members of the Court,
concurring in part). The State of North Carolina administered agricultural extension
programs through the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service. Id. at 388. One
of the activities sponsored by the Extension Service was the operation of 4-H clubs for
children and homemaker clubs for women, which were also segregated prior to 1965.
See Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 665, 668 (4th Cir. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 478 U.S. 385 (1986). In response to the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Extension Service discontinued its mandatory segregated club policy. Bazemore, 478
U.S. at 390-91 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Extension Service subsequently adopted a
number of measures designed to encourage voluntary desegregation of the clubs. Id at
407 (White, J., joined by four other justices, concurring).
175 Id. at 410-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). As of 1972, the last year such
statistics were kept, 98.8%o of the homemaker clubs were all black or all white. Id at
411.
176 Id. at 408 (White, J., joined by four other justices, concurring).
177 Brown, supra note 9 at 1157-62.
178 [The Court's] reasoning, however, is unpersuasive. As in Green, there is
little evidence that segregated 4-H and homemaker clubs were disman-
tled as a result of voluntary desegregation. Green rested in part upon the
notion that if voluntary choice does not lead to racial mixing of children,
then it cannot eliminate the effects of de jure segregation in public
schools. It is true that because of compulsory school attendance statutes,
students have to attend some school. Students, however, have always had
a choice between attending public schools or private schools. [See Pierce
v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)]. In Green, students (or their par-
ents) were given a choice as to which public school to attend. In addition,
most state compulsory school attendance statutes only mandate attend-
ance by children up to age 16 and in some states only to age 14. The
choice of a student to attend school beyond the compulsory school at-
tendance age is therefore as voluntary as the choice of a child to join a
particular 4-H or homemaker club. Yet the Supreme Court has never
suggested that court decrees ordering school desegregation should ex-
clude students that exceed the compulsory school attendance age.
Id. at 1159-60.
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disseminate useful and practical information on subjects relating to
agriculture and home economics. 179 The primary purpose of public
schools is to inculcate values. As a consquence, the inculcation of
fundamental values is not nearly as strong outside of public schools
as it is within public schools. Racial imbalance has less importance
in an institute charged with disseminating useful information, but it
is extremely relevant to an institution whose primary objective is the
inculcation of fundamental values.
2. United States v. Fordice-Remedial Obligation to Eradicate
the Vestiges of Dejure Segregation in the Educational
Context that Does Not Involve Children
In its recent opinion in United States v. Fordice, °80 the Court, for
the first time, addressed the obligation of a state to eradicate the
vesitiges of operating a dual school system at the university level.
Over several years, the Mississippi established eight universities. It
established five for white students and three for black students. 181
As late as the mid 1980s, more than ninety-nine percent of the white
students were enrolled in one of the five historically white universi-
ties. At the same time, ninety-two to ninety-nine percent of black
students attended the historically black colleges. 182 This constitutes
seventy-one percent of the black students enrolled in Mississippi's
universities.
In 1975, a group of African-American citizens brought a class
action suit against the State of Mississippi, claiming that Mississippi
had maintained the racial segregation through its prior dual system
of higher education.' 83 The United States intervened as a plain-
tiff.'8 4 After attempting to settle this dispute for twelve years, the
parties concluded that they could not agree on whether Mississippi
had taken sufficient affirmative steps to dismantle the effects of past
179 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 388-89 (Brennan J., joined by all other members of the
Court, concurring in part).
180 112 S. Ct. 2727.
181 The three universities established for blacks were Jackson State University, Al-
corn State University, and Mississippi Valley State University. The five universities es-
tablished for whites were University of Mississippi, Mississippi State University,
Mississippi University for Women, University of Southern Mississippi, and Delta State
University. Id at 2732.
182 Id at 2734. In addition to student racial imbalance, there was also considerable
faculty racial imbalance. In 1986, less than five percent of the faculty at any of the his-
torically white insitutions was African-American, and yet their percentage exceeded two-
thirds at the three historically black institutions. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d at 735 (5th
Cir.), vacated en banc, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom., United States v.
Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
183 Id. at 733.
184 Id.
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de jure segregation in its university system. 185 Mississippi argued
that it had fulfilled its duty by implementing and maintaining good-
faith, nondiscrimiantory policies in student admissions, faculty hir-
ing, and operations.' s6
The district court concluded that, in the higher education con-
text, the affirmative duty to dismantle a racially dual system places
greater emphasis "on current state higher education policies and
practices in order to insure that such policies and practices are ra-
cially neutral, developed and implemented in good faith, and do not
substantially contribute to the continued racial identifiabiltiy of indi-
vidual institutions."18 7 When the district court applied this stan-
dard to the Mississippi university system, it found that there was no
current violation of federal law.188
The court of appeals affirmed.' 8 9 While the court of appeals
agreed that "Mississippi was . . . constitutionally required to
elimintate invidious racial distinctions and dismantle its dual sys-
tem," 190 it found that Mississippi had done so by adopting and im-
plementing race neutral policies for operating its colleges and
universities.' 9 1 Because all students possessed freedom of choice to
attend the college or university they wished, there was no constitu-
tional violation. 192
The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the
case. The Court specifically noted the applicability of its decisions
in public school cases to the context of higher education. 93 How-
ever, the Court went on to note that the difference between the state
university system and public schools is that attendance at higher ed-
ucation is a matter of choice and that public universtities are not
185 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2733.
186 Id. at 2734.
187 Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1554 (N.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd 914 F.2d 676
(5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated sub nom., United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727
(1992).
188 Id. at 1564.
189 Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated sub nom, United
States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). The decision by the district court was origi-
nally addressed by a three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732
(5th Cir.), vacated en banc, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom., United States v.
Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). Over the dissent ofJustice Duhe, the majority reversed
and remanded the case to the district court, concluding that the badge of inferiority that
marked the historically black institutions had not been removed, and thus the racial
stigma remained. The majority indicated that the district court should seek the assist-
ance of experts from other disciplines, such as psychologists, sociologists, economists,
engineers and doctors, in order to formulate a definite plan for achieving unitary status.
190 Ayers, 914 F.2d at 682.
191 Id. at 687.
192 Id. at 688-89.
193 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2735.
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fungible-each university has been designated to perform certain
missions.194
The remedial duty that the Supreme Court imposed upon the
state in Fordice focuses on specific policies and practices of the state's
university system.
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its prior
system that continue to have segregative effects-whether by in-
fluencing student enrollment decisions or by fostering segrega-
tion in other facets of the university system-and such policies are
without sound educational justification and can be practicably
eliminated, the State has not satisifed its burden of proving that it
has dismantled its prior system. 195
In Fordice, the Court did not accept the formula for eradicating de
jure segregation that it applied in Bazemore.1 96 Nor did the Court-
as it did in Green-instruct lower courts to focus on the existence of
racial imbalance as means to determine the continued existence of
the vestiges of de jure segregation. 97 Rather, the Court required
the examination into specific policies and practices of a state's uni-
versity system that produces racial imbalance rather than the racial
imbalance itself.1 98
There are similarities and differences between the Court's treat-
ment of de jure segregation in public schools and de jure segrega-
tion in universities. In the university context, the duty imposed by
the Court is to eliminate discriminatory policies and practices, as
distinguished from the public school context, in which the duty is to
pursue affirmatively racial balancing.' 99 This difference in the scope
of duty entails that, in the public school context, once dejure segre-
gation is found to exist, the principal means of remedying the result-
ing harm is to eliminate racial imbalance; whereas, in the university
194 Id at 2736.
195 Id. at 2737.
196 Id Officially, the Court attempted to reconcile the two cases, distinguishing
Bazemore on its facts. This attempt, however, is unpersuasive. The district court in
Bazemore had concluded that no evidence existed of any lingering discrimination in either
the services or membership of the clubs and that racial imbalance resulted from the
wholly voluntary and unfettered choice of private individuals. Id. Because there was
evidence of lingering discrimination in Fordice, the Court argued, Bazemore did not re-
quire or justify the conclusion of the en banc panel. Id. In Fordice, however, unlike in
Bazemore, the Court examined unnecessary duplication one of the issues in determining
whether the vestiges of prior dejure conduct had been eliminated. Id. at 2742-43. This
was not required in Bazemore. Had such an inquiry been made, it would seem inevitable
that substantial duplication existed in North Carolina's 4-H clubs.
197 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2737.
198 Id
199 As noted in the prior discussion regarding Dowell and Freeman, see supra notes 67
to 140 and accompanying text, the racial balancing obligation relates only to the racial
imbalance that resulted from de jure segregation.
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context, even after a finding of de jure segregation, proof of racial
imbalance is insufficient. Thus, in the university context, the reme-
dies are not directed towards racial imbalance per se but towards
the policies and practices alleged to have produced and continued
to maintain it. According to the Court's opinion in Fordice, the ves-
tiges of prior dejure conduct can be eliminated without ever remov-
ing racial imbalance. 200
As in the context of public schools, the Court is requiring that
the rationale attached to continuing racial identifiability of universi-
ties be tracable to nondiscriminatory explanations. If a given policy
or practice was motivated by sound educational policy that cannot
practicably be eliminated, then the justification for racial imbalance
is not discriminatory.20
One of the major distinctions between the Court's treatment of
segregation in the university context and in the public school con-
text relates to the student's individual choice regarding which
school to attend. In Fordice, the Court noted that racial balancing
could not be pursued directly because university students were free
to choose which school they wished to attend.20 2 Individual choice,
however, is not an acceptable explanation for the maintenance of
racial imbalance in public schools if that racial imbalance has never
been eliminated.
200 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743. As a practical matter, whether this obligation ulti-
mately is determined to be different than the obligation placed on public schools will
depend in large measure on the reasons accepted as "sound educational policy." See id
at 2748-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that "the Court is essentially applying to universtities the amorphous standard adopted
for primary and secondary schools in Green").
201 From the opinions written by the Justices in Fordice it is difficult to tell how much
segregative effect can hide behind sound educational policy. An examination of the sep-
arate concurring opinions ofJustices Thomas and O'Connor, both of whom joined the
Court's opinion, can illustrative the uncertainty behind the implications of the majority
opinion. justice Thomas, for example, wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's
opinion had not foreclosed "the possibilty that there exists 'sound educational justifica-
tion' for maintaining historically black colleges as such." Id. at 2746 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Thomas noted that a state should be able to "operate a diverse assortment of
institutions-including historically black institutions--open to all on a race-neutral ba-
sis, but with established traditions and programs that might disproportionately appeal to
one race or another." Id. Thomas' opinion, therefore, seems to accept the possibility
that the continued existence of one or more of the historically black colleges could be
justified by designating its purpose accordingly.
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, wrote separately "to emphasize that it is Mis-
sissippi's burden to prove that it has undone its prior segregation, and that the circum-
stances in which a State may maintain a policy or practice traceable to de jure
segregation that has segregative effects are narrow." Id. at 2743. She also noted that
"[w]here the State can accomplish legitimate educational objectives through less segre-
gative means, the courts may infer lack of good faith." Id at 2744. This would appear
to foreclose the operation of "historically black colleges as such."
202 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2736.
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Individual choice plays a different role in the context of univer-
sities and public schools. At the university level, choices about
which institutions to attend are made by adults, whose primary con-
cern is pursuit of self-defined, individual interests. In contrast,
when the Green Court ordered racial balancing for the public
schools, it actually rejected parental choice as a justification for the
continued existence of racial imbalance. Hence, the issue raised in
Green did not relate to students' choices about their education,
which might not be given much weight because of their youth,20 3
but rather to choices that parents wished to make for their children.
Articulating this distinction allows us to frame properly the question
from the perspective of the value inculcating theory. The issue is
whether racial imbalance that resulted from parents choosing the
schools their childern attended was a sufficient justification for the
conclusion that the discriminatory meaning attached to the opera-
tion of a dual school system had not been eliminated.
The Supreme Court has recognized that parents have a funda-
mental right to raise their children. That right is violated if the state
mandates that all children attend public schools.20 4 That right,
however, has not been extended to give parents the right to choose
which public school their children will attend or which classes their
children can be excused from taking.20 5 In fact, the implicit assump-
tion behind compulsory school attendance statutes is that parents
should not be trusted with the sole authority to determine the up-
203 Even though the Supreme Court has held that children are persons for purposes
of interpreting the Constitution, it has also noted that the constitutional rights of chil-
dren differ from those of adults. Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Children are not
born with developed cognitive faculties and also lack the experience, maturity, and judg-
ment of adults. In addition, children are not generally self-sufficient. Unlike adults,
children are not considered independent and autonomous, with externally constitued
goals, preferences, and objectives that must be respected. While our legal system sees
adults as choosers, it sees children as learners. Racial imbalance in public schools could
never be justified on the basis of a child's freedom of choice regarding which schools to
attend because choices by minors are not accorded the same weight as choices by adults.
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding a law making it a crime
for a girl under 18 to sell any newspapers, periodicals, or merchandise in public places,
despite the fact that a child of the Jehovah's Witnessess faith believed that it was a reli-
gious duty to perform this work).
204 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
205 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (stating that it was not neces-
sary to determine the feelings of Amish children when it held that the right of Amish
parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children allowed them to exempt their
children from Wisconsin's compulsory attendance statutes); Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (rejecting
a free exercise challenge requiring that students learn critical reading from Holt, Rine-
hart & Winston basic reading series). But see Mary Michelle U. Hirschoff, Parents and the
Public School Curriculum: Is There a Right to Have One's Child Excused From Objectionable In-
struction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 871 (1977) (arguing that there should be a right for parents
to control the exposure of their children to objectionable materials).
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bringing of their children. 20 6 While children must be taught to de-
cide for themselves what is in their best interest, government also
has an interest in restricting those choices so that these students
learn to respect and tolerate the right of others to decide for them-
selves as well. 20 7 Regulating private schools and operating public
schools is the way that the state advances that interest.208 By incul-
cating appropriate values, public schools advance the collective in-
terest of society in assuring that future generations of adult citizens
are properly acculturated.
The state cannot rely on parents to fulfill its interest in the
proper inculcation of values, because the parents' influence will
often be what the state is attempting to counteract. The inculcation
of values by public schools is, therefore, not intended to be an ex-
tension of the family socializing process. When there is a dispute
about which values are appropriate, this process will be at odds with
the parents' wishes. 20 9 When the racial imbalance has its genesis in
the operation of the dual school system, justifying its continued
existence by pointing to the wishes of parents is not compelling. To
accept that the continued racial imbalance is justified because of pa-
rental belief about African-Americans, which may have also been a
reflection of their acceptance of the invidious value, is a continua-
tion of the prior harm, rather than a remedy for it.210
3. Sui Generis Remedy for Public Schools
The Bazemore Court rejected the need to integrate 4-H clubs in
order to eliminate the harm resulting from de jure segregation. In
doing so, the Court rejected classifying and treating minors outside
of the educational context as members of racial and ethnic groups
for purposes of eradicating the harm of de jure segregation. In
Fordice, the Court rejected the need to assign students to universities
in order to obtain guaranteed racial balancing by eliminating the
operation of a dual university school system and, thereby, refused to
206 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510, upholds the right of the state to compel attendance by
children at some school, even if such attendance is against their parents' wishes.
207 Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Indi-
vidual Rights in the Public Schools, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1649 (1986).
208 The establishment of public schools and concomitant compulsory school attend-
ance statutes reflect, in part, the exercise by a state of its police power to assure the
public health, safety, welfare, and morality. See, e.g., State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H.
1929); State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (Ind. 1901).
209 See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1058 (rejecting parents free exercise challenge to the
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston basic reading series). But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
at 205 (upholding the right of Amish parents to exempt their children from compulsory
school attendance statutes when attendance violated their religious beliefs).
210 But see, e.g., LINO GRALIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976) (arguing that the Court did
not have sufficient reason to order racial balancing in Green v. New Kent County).
[Vol. 78:1
DE JURE SEGREGATION
treat students as members of a racial group in order to eliminate the
harm of de jure segregation.
The use of racial balancing to eliminate the harm of de jure
segregation in public schools required the state to differentiate be-
tween students on the basis of their membership in a racial group.
In other words, employing racial balancing as the remedy for dejure
segregation requires, in most school systems, that the state classify
and assign students to schools, not as students, but as black students
and white students. The Supreme Court has also indicated that
public school officials, implementing educational policy, could pre-
scribe racial balancing if they believed it necessary to prepare stu-
dents to live in a pluralistic society.2 1' This would also permit
public school officials to treat students as members of racial and eth-
nic groups, not as individuals. The Court's apparent approval of
public officials' right to treat students as members of racial and eth-
nic groups to remedy dejure segregation reflects the uniqueness of
public education. Allowing school officials to treat students as
members of racial and ethnic groups is consistent with the view of
public education as a value inculcating institution. It is not the ac-
tions by state officials that are important; rather, it is the meaning
attributed to such actions. The motivations that generated the use
of racial classifications are the primary consideration because these
motivations impart meaning to the governmental act, and therefore
determine the values being socialized.
D. Comparison of the Invidious Value Inculcation Theory and
Justice Marshall's Stigmatic Harm Theory
Justice Marshall's dissent in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell, joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, presents a stig-
matic harm theory to explain the Supreme Court's dejure segrega-
tion jurisprudence.2 1 2 Marshall argued that "a desegregation
decree cannot be lifted so long as conditions likely to inflict the stig-
211 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
212 The idea that segregation is unconstitutional because it is racially insulting was
first suggested in the legal academic literature by Professors Black and Cahn. See Black,
supra note 41, at 426; Cahn, infra note 215, at 150; see also Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences
and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Uncertainty, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE,
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 27 (Ray C. Rish & Ronald J. Anson eds., 1977); Lawrence,
supra note 401, at 439-40.
Professor Yudof has suggested a theory to limit government speech that parallels,
to some extent, the invidious value inculcation theory. He notes that governments com-
municate through a multitude of acts disseminating information and withholding infor-
mation. These acts or omissions have an important impact by influencing the attitudes
and opinions of the populace. Yudof asserts that certain governmental communications
should be considered ultra vires in the sense that there are certain messages beyond the
power of the government to disseminate. YUDOF, supra note 19, at 296-306 (1983).
1992]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
matic injury condemned in Brown I persist and there remain feasible
methods of eliminating such conditions." 21 3
Our pointed focus in Brown I upon the stigmatic injury caused by
segregated schools explains our unflagging insistence that for-
merly dejure segregated school districts extinguish all vestiges of
school segregation. The concept of stigma also gives us guidance
as to what conditions must be eliminated before a decree can be
deemed to have served its purpose.2 14
The stigmatic theory, articulated by Justice Marshall, assumes that
de jure segregation produced an abstract harm that is distinct from
any observable harm. 215 The theory articulated in this Article also
views the harm resulting from de jure segregation as an abstract
harm.216 Both theories, therefore, see the harm as an interpretative
harm resulting from the meaning attached to segregation.
Justice Marshall's theory, however, is about racial discrimina-
tion harm applied in the context of public education. My theory is
about an educational harm applied to race discrimination. Unlike
Justice Marshall's theory, which grounds the harm of dejure segre-
gation in its stigmatic impact on African-American children, the in-
vidious value inculcation theory grounds the harm in the context of
the socializing function of public schools. Where Marshall sees the
harm of de jure segregation as stigmatizing African-American
school children, thereby singling out African-Americans as the vic-
tims, 217 I see the harm as distorting the value inculcating process of
public schools. I therefore view remedies for de jure segregation
not as benefiting solely African-Americans, but rather as benefiting
the socializing function of public schools. As a result, the interests
of all students are implicated in the harm of, and remedies for, de
jure segregation.
213 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215 De jure segregation is a "public symbol of the inferior position" of African-
Americans. Charles R. Lawrence III, Segregation "Misunderstood': The Milliken Decision
Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15, 26 (1977). As such a symbol, racial segregation in public
schools violates the Constitution because such segregation is an "invidious labeling de-
vice." Id. at 24. Through segregation, government insults or offends the dignity of the
minority against whom the prejudice is directed. See Larry G. Simon, Racially Prudiced
Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimina-
tion, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1047 (1978). There is no need for evidence to support
the-proposition that segregation is an insult to African-Americans, [s]egregation does
involve stigma; "the community knows it does." Edmond CahnJurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 150, 158 (1955).
216 See supra note 215.
217 Much of my criticism of remedies for dejure segregation stems from the very fact
that these remedies proceed from the notion that African-Americans were the ones dam-
aged by de jure segregation. See infra notes 225-65.
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Stigmatic theories typically proceed from an assertion that the
harm of de jure segregation results from governmental decisions
based upon an intent to stigmatize. One weakness of stigmatic theo-
ries like Justice Marshall's, in the context of de jure segregation of
public schools, is that such theories do not provide an adequate ini-
tial justification for desegregation as the principal means to remedy
the harm they identify. The harm is presumed to flow from govern-
mental action taken with the intent to stigmatize. If the governmen-
tal action would nevertheless have been taken absent the
stigmatizing motives, then the stigmatic harm would not exist.21 8
Courts could eradicate stigma by ensuring that government deci-
sions are made on a racially neutral basis.2 19 Therefore, under a
stigmatic theory, neighborhood school assignments could eradicate
the stigmatic injury, a position Marshall would surely dispute.220
Marshall would certainly agree that, originally, desegregation was
necessary to eliminate the harm of de jure segregation. While I do
not disagree with Justice Marshall's position that desegregation was
a proper remedy, I simply argue that Marshall's theory may not sup-
port the remedy.
My theory asserts that the state's stigmatic designation operates
differently within the context of public schools than in other govern-
mental contexts because, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out, public
education is "the one public institution which, by its very nature, is a
place for the selective conveyance of ideas."' 22 1 Once dejure segre-
gation is found to exist, the use of race-neutral means to make
school assignments does not eliminate the inculcation of the invidi-
ous value if racial mixing does not occur. The race-neutral assign-
ments that perpetuate racial segregation in public schools, which
flows from invidious state motivations, reflects the established pat-
terns of belief about African-Americans that are rooted in the invidi-
ous value. Racial imbalance rooted in this motive has to be
disestablished before schools can eliminate invidious value inculca-
tion. Therefore, racial mixing is a required part of the remedy.
Finally, unlike Justice Marshall, I do not see the continued exis-
tence of segregated residential patterns as a vestige of school au-
218 Yudof, supra note 36, at 106.
219 The district court, in Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), cap-
tured the essence of the remedy for the stigmatic approach when it stated that "[t]he
Constitution... does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination." Id at
777. The forbiding of discrimination would eliminate the harm flowing from govern-
mental action taken with the intent to stigmatize.
220 Dowell, I11 S. Ct. at 645 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that, against the back-
drop of former state-sponsored single-race schools, any persistence of such schools per-
petuates a message of inferiority).
221 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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thorities' prior discriminatory conduct.222 According to the theory I
have articulated, the harm of de jure segregation was based upon
the assumption that African-Americans were not equal to Cauca-
sians. Once a school system has implemented an effective desegre-
gation plan and operated that plan for a reasonable period of time,
the original assumptions that led to the segregation of black and
white school children will be eliminated. Because it is difficult to
estimate how much time will be sufficient, such an estimation should
depend upon the differing circumstances in each individual school
district.
If a school system that has disestablished its dual school system
for a reasonable period of time institutes a neighborhood school as-
signment policy, the motives of school officials must be assessed in
order to determine the meaning, and thereby the values, being so-
cialized by this practice. Segregated schools that are the product of
private residential decision making might not inculcate the invidious
value simply because they are racially identifiable. They might in-
stead reflect the belief articulated in Dowell: that neighborhood
schools allow for greater parental involvement and thereby improve
the academic environment for children. 223
IV
THE COURT'S IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK EMPLOYED TO
JUSTIFY REMEDIES FOR DE JURE SEGREGATION
The Supreme Court's dejure segregation jurisprudence can be
thought of as the best example of the Court giving life to the re-
quirement of racial equality enshrined in the Equal Protection
Clause. Few would doubt that the Court's desire, in Brown I, was to
correct the historic injustice of dejure segregation. If remedies for
dejure segregation, however, are to embody a belief in racial equal-
ity, those remedies must explicitly proceed from an uncompromised
and unqualified fundamental premise that blacks are equal to
whites. Yet, an examination of the rationale that led to the remedies
for de jure segregation illustrates that the Supreme Court did not
base the remedies on an assumption of true equality. Rather, the
Court justified its decisions implicitly, and in some instances explic-
itly, on the inferiority of African-Americans.
This Part discusses the Court's ideological framework that led
to the ordering of remedies for de jure segregation. In Brown I and
Green v. New Kent County,224 the Court sanctioned court-ordered inte-
222 For further discussion that one of the vestiges of prior discriminatory conduct
was residential segregation, see supra notes 107-40.
223 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 634.
224 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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gration of schools as the primary means to remedy the harm result-
ing from dejure segregation. In Milliken II, the Court also approved
the use of certain educational programs as the means to remedy
harm caused by de jure segregation.225 In all of those cases, the
Court is proceding from an ideological framework that accepts the
notion that segregation retarded the cognitive psychological and
emotional development of only African-Americans. According to
the Court's opinion, remedies for de jure segregation benefit only
African-American school children because segregation actually
made them inferior.226
A. The Ideological Framework that Approved Desegregation
as a Means to Remedy the Harm Resulting From De
Jure Segregation
To be effective, ideologies must connect to real problems and
real life experiences. 227 Three aspects of the Court's reasoning, in
justifying integration as the principal means to remedy the harm of
de jure segregation, suggest that the Court believed that segrega-
tion made African-Americans inferior to Caucasians. First, in
searching for a harm, the Court only pointed to the presumed im-
pact of segregation on African-American school children.228 Sec-
ond, the Court in Brown I noted that, even in situations where the
physical facilities and other tangible factors were equal, the schools
attended by African-Americans were nevertheless inferior because
their schools lacked the "intangibles. ' 229 Finally, because of the as-
sumption that African-Americans only benefit from desegrega-
tion,230 the Court has always viewed desegregation as necessary to
vindicate only the rights of African-American school children.23 1
225 See supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 288-93 and accompanying text.
227 Michael W. Apple, The Politics of Common Sense: Schooling, Populism, and the New
Right, in CRITICAL PEDAGOGY, THE STATE, AND CULTURAL STRUGGLE (H. Giroux & P. Mc-
Laren eds., 1989).
228 112 S. Ct. at 1443. The research by the psychologist purporting to show that
African-Americans in public schools had lower self-esteem has been the subject of criti-
cism recently in WILLIAM CROSS, SHADES OF BLACK (1990) (arguing that the psychologist
confused racial group preference with self-esteem, assuming that racial group prefer-
ence would automatically correspond with self-esteem). For a more complete discussion
of Cross's theory, see infra note 305.
229 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
230 Derrick Bell, The Dialectics of School Desegregation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 281, 295 (1981).
231 See infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
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1. The Negative Impact of Segregation on African-Americans
Before Brown I, the NAACP had orchestrated a constitutional
attack on segregation in graduate and professional schools.232 Prior
to the NAACP's campaign, African-Americans experienced numer-
ous disadvantages in seeking higher educational opportunities. 233
Black public colleges were unequal to white public colleges in num-
bers, facilities, faculty training, and breadth and depth of curricu-
lum. 23 4 This inequality was most apparent at the graduate and
professional school level. In 1940, while all seventeen segregation-
ist states 23 5 had white public colleges with extensive graduate and
professional school programs, only three states-Virginia, Texas
and North Carolina-had instituted graduate instruction at their
black public colleges. 23 6 In 1940, only two of the approximately
thirty black public colleges in the segregationist states had profes-
sional schools, 23 7 and none offered programs leading to a
232 For discussion of the NAACP legal strategy, see KLUGER, supra note 39; MARK V.
TUSHNET, NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950
(1987).
233 In the 1930s, a white student desiring to attend college had five times as many
colleges to choose from as his African-American counterpart. Those colleges also of-
fered the white student with a richer and more diverse curriculum. RAVrrCH, supra note
53, at 121. In 1956, the Supreme Court confirmed that Brown I applied to colleges and
universities. Board of Trustees v. Frasier 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (per curiam), aff'g 134 F.
Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955).
Professor Kujovich, in an insightful article, discusses the history of the systematic
underfunding of African-American institutions of higher education. See Gil Kujovich,
Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public College: The Era of Separate But
Equal, 72 MINN. L. REV. 29 (1987).
234 Kujovich, supra note 233, at 113.
235 The states referred to throughout this Article as the segregationist states are the
17 states and the District of Columbia that maintained a rigid system of segregation in
public education during the separate but equal era. These states are Alabama, Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.
236 Kujovich, supra note 233, at 113. Graduate schools are different from profes-
sional schools, which include law, medicine, and dentistry.
237 The black professional schools were North Carolina College for Negroes School
of Law and Library Science and Lincoln University Law School in Missouri. Kujovich,
supra note 233, at 113. The law school at Lincoln University was actually the result of
the NAACP's litigation success in Missouri es rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
The all-white University of Missouri Law School had refused to admit Lloyd Lionel
Gaines because of his race. The State of Missouri offered to pay Gaines' extra expenses
for a legal education in an out-of-state law school or, alternatively, to build a law school
for African-Americans at Lincoln University, the black public college. The Missouri
Supreme Court found that the scholarship program was substantially equal to the op-
portunity offered white students at the University of Missouri and rejected Gaines' chal-
lenge. State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. 1937), rev'd, 305 U.S. 337
(1938).
In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that the validity of segregation laws
"rest[ed] wholly upon the equality of the privileges which the laws give to the separated
groups within the State." Gaines, 305 U.S. at 349. While law schools in other states
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Ph.D.23 8 While all of the segregationist states provided for graduate
training in engineering for white students, no such training was
available at any of the black institutions.23 9
When the Court addressed segregation in the graduate and
professional school cases, 240 it was not necessary to overturn the
"separate but equal" doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson24 t in
order to grant the African-American plaintiffs relief.242 The harm
resulting from segregation in the graduate and professional school
cases was the denial to African-Americans of opportunities for pro-
fessional training equal to to those provided to Caucasian students.
The "separate" provided by the Southern states in the graduate and
professional context did not approach objectively measurable equal-
ity, so the NAACP had little trouble showing the denial of equal-
might have been every bit as good as that of the University of Missouri, the relevant
question was what kind of opportunity the state of Missouri provide for the two racial
groups. Id. Missouri had given a privilege to whites, that of attending the University of
Missouri Law School within the state, that it had not given to African-Americans. The
Supreme Court ruled that Gaines "was entitled to be admitted to the law school of the
State University in the absence of other and proper provision for his legal training
within the State." ld. at 352.
Gaines never actually enrolled in the University of Missouri Law School. RAvrrCH,
supra note 53, at 122. Therefore, we do not know what reaction his enrollment would
have provoked. After the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Missouri legislature
established a law school for African-Americans at Lincoln University. Gaines, 131
S.W.2d at 218-19. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that as long as the facilities at
Lincoln University were "substantially equivalent" to those at the University of Missouri,
the absence of other and proper provision for Gaines had been redressed, thus he had
no right to attend the University of Missouri. Id. at 220. The NAACP was unable to
locate Gaines in order to challenge this action by Missouri. See Lucile H. Bluford, The
Lloyd Gaines Story, 1958J. LEGAL EDUC. Soc. 242-46 (1959). If they had, they could have
challenged the establishment of the separate law schools to determine if the Court
would have considered it sufficient to meet the dictates of separate but equal. Thus, the
issue that the Court later addressed in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), discussed
infra note 243, might have been addressed 10 years earlier.
238 RAvrrCH, supra note 53, at 121.
239 Id. "The number of states with white public colleges offering different profes-
sional curricula were as follows: graduate engineering-17, law-16, medicine-15 ...
graduate commerce and business-15, pharmacy-14, library science-l1, social ser-
vice-9, and dentistry-4." Kujovich, supra note 233, at 113 n.303.
240 The Supreme Court cases addressing segregation in graduate and professional
schools was actually preceded by Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (Md.
1936). Donald Murray, an African-American graduate of Amherst College, applied to
the University of Maryland Law School, who denied him admission because of his race.
Id at 590. While Maryland did not provide any legal training for African-Americans, it
quickly appropriated $10,000 to fund an out-of-state scholarship program. Id. at 593.
The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the program was insufficient to provide Mur-
ray with equal educational opportunities. Id.
241 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
242 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ev rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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ity.2 4 3 The Court did not need to consider whether segregation per
se had a negative impact on African-Americans or on the educa-
tional process of those institutions.
The Court's analysis in Brown I begins with the assumption that
the physical facilities and other tangible factors of the public schools
attended by black and white students were equal.24 4 Given the ob-
jectively measurable equality of segregation in this context, the
Court was forced to identify another harm resulting from segrega-
tion. 245 The Court could have focused on the impact of segregation
on the socializing process in all public schools attended by whites or
blacks. Instead, the Court focused on the presumed impact that
segregation had on African-American children. 246 Brown I stands as
the basis of the Court's theory that segregating public schools ad-
versely affects African-Americans only.
243 In Brown I, the Court mentioned that its decisions in Sweatt and McLaurin also
rested on the recognition of intangibles. 347 U.S. at 493-94. Yet in Sweatt, the Court
also focused on the objectively measurable differences between the Universtiy of Texas
Law School and the Texas Law School for Negroes. 339 U.S. at 632-34. At the time
Sweatt applied, no law school existed in Texas that admitted African-Americans. Id. at
631. While Sweatt's appeal was pending, however, the Texas legislature appropriated
enough money to establish a law school for African-Americans. Id. at 632; KLUGER, supra
note 39, at 261. In comparing the newly-created Texas Law School of Negroes with the
University of Texas Law School, the Court noted that the University of Texas Law
School had a student body of 850 students, a library with over 65,000 volumes and a
faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632. Also
available at the University of Texas Law School were a "law review, moot court facilities
... and the Order of the Coifaffiliation." Id. at 632-33. In contrast, by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court, the law school for African-Americans had only 23 students,
a faculty of five full-time professors, and a library of approximately 16,500 volumes.
Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633.
While George W. McLaurin was eventually admitted to the University of Oklahoma
Graduate School, his admission was on a segregated basis. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 639-
40. Therefore, he was subject to "such rules and regulations as to segregation as the
President of the University shall consider to afford ... substantially equal educational
opportunities as are afforded to other persons .. ." Id. at 640. McLaurin was originally
required to sit apart from the rest of his classmates at a designated desk. Id. Although
he was allowed on the main floor of the library, he was restricted to his own table. Id.
He also had to eat in the cafeteria at a segregated table. Id. With regard to McLaurin,
the segregation regulations imposed upon him also had some very material and objec-
tively unequal results.
244 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492. "We come then to the question presented: Does segre-
gation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority
group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does." Id at 493.
245 "Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible
factors in the Negro and white schools .... We must look instead to the effect of
segregation itself on public education." Id. at 492.
246 See id. at 493-94.
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In one of the most quoted phrases from Brown 1,247 the Court
said, "[t]o separate [African-American youth] from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feel-
ing of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. ' 248 The
Court went on to quote approvingly from the district court in
Kansas:
'Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children... ; [ffor the policy
of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the infer-
iority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the moti-
vation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development
of negro children .... 249
The Court, therefore, explicitly stated that segregation made
African-American children inferior. Certainly the temptation exists
to explain those quotations in Brown I as simply unfortunate
passages that the Court no longer accepts. In Freeman, however,
Justice Kennedy noted that the principal wrongs of the de jure sys-
tem were the injuries and stigma inflicted upon the disfavored
race.250 Justice Kennedy went on to quote the above passages, reit-
erating that the Court continues to perceive among the harms of de
jure segregation to be not only stigma, but also tangible harms.
2. Segregated Public Schools that African-Americans Attended Lacked
"Intangibles"
While the Court, in Brown I, assumed that the African-American
children in segregated schools had equal physical facilities and other
tangible factors, 251 it declared that they were nevertheless deprived
247 Professor Derrick Bell notes that proponents of integration quoted this phrase
repeatedly, in order to justify their belief that integration provides the proper route to
equality. Bell, supra note 230, at 285.
248 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494. The social science evidence cited by the Court was
specifically intended to prove that segregation produced a psychological harm to
African-Americans. Ik at 494 n. 11. For discussion of recent criticism of this statement,
see infra note 319.
Many have expressed doubt that the social science evidence cited in Brown I actually
influenced thejustices. See Cahn, supra note 215, at 150, 157-58, 157 n.16; RAUH Ross
& ERNST VAN DEN HAAG, THE FABRc OF Socimy 165-66 (1957).
249 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D.
Kan. 1951)) (emphasis added).
250 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443.
251 Id. at 492 n.4. The Court noted:
In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality.... In
the South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants were
proceeding "promptly and in good faith to comply with the court's de-
cree" . . . [t]he Virgina Attorney General's brief on reargument [indi-
cated] that the [equalization] program has now been completed. In the
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of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated
school system.252 Thus the segregated schools that African-
Americans attended lacked certain "intangibles."
The Court analogized these intangibles to those discussed in
Sweatt v. Painter,253 when the Court addressed the differences be-
tween the University of Texas Law School and the Texas Law
School for Negroes. 254 The "intangibles" in Sweatt were very evi-
dent. It is not difficult to assume that the University of Texas pro-
vides better training for law students than the Texas Law School for
Negroes. Any law school that, by law, excludes a race (whites) from
which the overwhelming majority ofjudges and other attorneys will
come, handicaps the ability of its students to develop those impor-
tant personal contacts that are so essential for a law student's future
success in his or her chosen vocation as an attorney.
In comparison to law schools, the vocational function of ele-
mentary and secondary schools is minimal. Segregated schools, es-
pecially those with truly equivalent resources, can provide African-
Americans with the basic skills that can be built upon for vocational
purposes. 255 In fact, social scientists, taking their cue from the
Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's equaliza-
tion program was well under way.
Id. at 492 n.9.
252 Id at 494. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Freeman quotes this passage from Brown I
as well. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443.
253 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (discussed supra note 243).
254 The Court stated:
In Sweatt v. Painter ... in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes
could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court re-
lied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in law school." In McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents .... the Court, in requiring that a Negro ad-
mitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students,
again resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession." Such considerations apply with addedforce to
children in grade and high schools.
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-94 (emphasis added).
255 The Court, however, did not actually require mandatory racial mixing as the
principle means to remedy the harm of segregation in public elementary and secondary
schools until Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Prior to Green, the results
of the Coleman Report cast serious doubt on the ability of school desegregation to have
much of an impact on the academic achievement of African-American youth. As part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress commissioned a study, commonly referred to as
the "Coleman Report," to determine the "lack of availability of equal educational op-
portunit[y]" for individuals of different race, color, religion or national origin. JAMES S.
COLEMAN, EQUALrr OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY iii (1966). In the fall of 1965, a re-
search team led by James Coleman ofJohn Hopkins University and Ernest Campbell of
Vanderbilt University surveyed some 4,000 public elementary and secondary schools.
Id. at 1, 80. The research team not only scrutinized educational facilities, materials,
curricula, and laboratories, but also analyzed educational achievement as determined by
standardized tests. Id. at iii. After noting that tangible equality had been substantially
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Supreme Court, have tried for years to establish that desegregation
alone would lead to significant increases in the educational achieve-
ment of African-Americans. These studies, however, have not been
able to establish consistently significant educational benefits for
African-Americans derived from racial mixing alone.25 6
achieved between the public schools for African-Americans and the public schools for
Caucasians, the Coleman Report concluded that African-American students in desegre-
gated schools did only slightly better than African-Americans in segregated schools on
standardized achievement test. In order to determine the effect of desegregation on
student achievement, the Coleman Report compared the achievement levels of four
groups of African-American students: (1) those in majority-white classes; (2) those in
classes that were half black and half white; (3) those in majority-black classes; and (4)
those in all black classes. Id. at 31-32. The Report stated that African-American stu-
dents in the first group generally received the highest scores on standardized tests,
although the differences from group to group were small. Id. at 29. Because there was
no court-ordered busing when the Coleman Report was conducted in 1965, the African-
Americans who attended majority-white schools presumably lived in integrated neigh-
borhoods. Their slightly better performance may, therefore, have been simply reflective
of their more privileged socioeconomic position. If so, then the academic performance
of black students in majority-white classes adds force to one of the major findings of the
study: the socioeconomic status of the student was a strong determinant in academic
achievement.
African-American students' achievement, however, did not rise in proportion to the
presence of white classmates. Although African-American students in majority-white
classes generally had the highest scores, black students in all-black classes actually
scored as high or higher than those in half-black or majority-black schools. Id. at 31.
Moreover, in the Midwest, some African-American students in all-black classes out-
performed even those African-Americans in majority-white classes. Id. at 32.
Some have cited the Coleman Report as vindicating desegregation as the appropri-
ate means in which to increase academic achievement by African-Americans. This is
because Coleman noted that the academic achievement of children from lower socio-
economic backgrounds, whether white or black, improved by being in schools with chil-
dren from higher socioeconomic backgrounds (whether black or white). This statement,
when added to the assumption that whites, in general, are of a higher socioeconomic
background than blacks, led to a belief that desegregation would benefit African-
Americans academically.
Coleman himself was concerned about the misuse of the Report by those arguing
for desegregation as a means to increase the academic achievement of African-
Americans. In a letter he sent to the New York Times, Coleman expressed this concern:
My opinion .... is that the results [of the Coleman Report] ... have been
used inappropriately by the courts to support the premise that equal pro-
tection for black children is not provided unless racial balance is achieved
in schools. I believe it is necessary to recognize that equal protection, in
the sense of equal educational opportunity, cannot be provided by the
State.
James S. Coleman, Letter, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Summer 1972, at 127-28.
256 See Court Ordered School Busing: Hearings on S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S. 1647, S.
1743, and S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1981) (statement of HerbertJ. Walberg, Professor of
Education, University of Illinois, Chicago); ROBERT L. CRAIN ET AL., MAKING DESEGREGA-
TION WORK 70 (1982); Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority Achievements
in Desegregated Schools, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 103-25 (Chris-
tine H. Russell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983); see, e.g., Max Green, Thinking Realistically
About Integration, NEW PERSPECTIVEs, Fall 1984, at 35; Walter G. Stephen, School Desegre-
gation: An Evaluation of Predictions Made in Brown v. Board of Education, 85 PSYCHOL.
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If one begins with an assumption of equality of physical facili-
ties and other tangible factors, then it becomes apparent that the
intangible difference between the white schools and the black
schools is the absence of whites in the latter. The valuable "in-
tangibles" lacking in the black schools, therefore, were attributes
that must have been endemic only to white teachers and students.
In reaching its decision, the Court failed to mention the fact that
white children were also denied the benefits of a racially integrated
education. To presume that African-American students would
profit so much by attending classes with Caucasians, as opposed to
being in educational institutions by themselves, leads to the ines-
capable conclusion that there is something better about being with
whites than being with blacks.2 57 The implication of such a position
is that whites are better than blacks.
3. Desegregation as a Vindication of the Rights of African-American
School Children
It was not until thirteen years after Brown I that the Supreme
Court placed upon school boards an obligation to mix affirmatively
the races in public schools. In Green v. New Kent County,258 the Court
struck down a "freedom of choice" plan, which allowed a pupil to
choose his own public school, because the plan did not produce a
significant amount of racial balancing in the schools. 25 9 The New
Kent County School Board argued that its "freedom of choice" plan
BULL. 217 (1978); Symposium, School Desegregation: Lessons of the First Twenty-Five Years,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1978, at 1-133; Stuart W. Cook, Social Science and
School Desegregation: Did We Mislead the Supreme Court?, 5 PERSONALrIY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 420, 420-37 (1979); see also Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1534 (10th
Cir. 1989) (Baldock, J., dissenting) (noting the testimony of Dr. Walberg and Dr. Crain
that segregated schools inhibit learning, but also noting studies conflict concerning the
effects of desegregation on achievement); COLEMAN, supra note 255.
If desegregation does not succeed in significantly raising the academic achievement
of African-Americans, then from the perspective of the academic function of schools, its
continued use as an appropriate remedy is open to serious question. I do not deny that
segregation may have caused an academic harm to African-Americans; I simply argue
that such a harm is not the most appropriate one for the Supreme Court to address.
257 This point was also made by Black Nationalists during the late 1960s about
integration:
'Integregation'... is based on complete acceptance of the fact that in
order to have a decent house or education, black people must move into
a white neighborhood or send their children to a white school. This rein-
forces, among both black and white, the idea that "white" is automatically
superior and 'black' is by definition inferior.
STOKELY CHARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER 54 (1967) (Charmichael,
the former chairperson of the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC),
has since changed his name to Kwame Toure).
258 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
259 Id. at 441. Under the "freedom-of-choice" plan, no whites had enrolled in the
black school, and only fifteen percent of blacks had enrolled in the white school. Id.
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could only be faulted by finding that the Fourteenth Amendment
required compulsory integration.260 The Court's response to the
School Board was that
[its] argument ignores the thrust of Brown 11.261 In the light of
the command of that case, what is involved here is the question
whether the Board has achieved the 'racially nondiscriminatory
school system' Brown II held must be effectuated in order to rem-
edy the established unconstitutional deficiencies of its segregated
system.... School boards such as the respondent then operating
state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be neces-
sary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch. . . . The constitutional
rights of Negro school children articulated in Brown I permit no
less than this; and it was to this end that Brown II commanded
school boards to bend their efforts. 262
Thus, the duty to desegregate public schools was born.2 63 The
Court's justification for desegregation was, simply, that the constitu-
The Court noted that "transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was
and is the ultimate end to be brought about." Idi at 436.
One of the provisions included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited federal
financial assistance from being given to programs or activities engaged in discrimina-
tion. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare issued regulations addressing
racial discrimination in federally aided school systems as directed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-
1, and in the statement of policies or guidelines, the Department's Office of Education
established standards for eligibilty for federal funds of school systems in the process of
desegregation. 45 CFR §§ 80.1-80.13, 181.1-181.76 (1976). "Freedom of choice"
plans were seen as accepatable under these regulations. See 391 U.S. at 433-34 n.2; LINO
A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976).
260 391 U.S. at 437.
261 Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
262 391 U.S. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
263 The Court's opinion in Brown II required public schools to effectuate a transition
to a "racially nondiscriminatory school system." 349 U.S. at 301. The precise parame-
ters of what was meant by a racially nondiscriminatory school system were originally left
to the discretion of school authorities who had the primary responsibility for elucidat-
ing, assessing, and solving this problem. Id at 299. Many southern federal judges and
school officials implementing this obligation relied upon the dictum in Briggs v. Elliot,
132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), to fill the vacuum left by the Supreme Court. In
addressing one of the companion cases of Brown I on remand, a three-judge federal
district court in South Carolina wrote:
[The Supreme Court] has not decided that the states must mix persons of
different races in the schools or must require them to attend schools or
must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools they attend. What
it has decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny to
any person on account of race the right to attend any school that it main-
tains.... The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely
forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of
voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce
segregation.
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tional rights of African-American school children required it. 264 Because the
Court has viewed the benefit of remedies for de jure segregation as
accruing to African-American students,265 it has never indicated that
desegregation is necessary in order to vindicate the rights of white
school children.
Id at 777 (emphasis added).
Many states and school systems employed various methods to comply minimally or
avoid compliance with the constitutional duty. In May, 1964, ten years after Brown I, less
than two percent of the African-American school children in the South attended school
with whites. RAvrrCH, supra note 53, at 162-63. Measures passed by southern states
included such provisions as:
the denial of state funds to schools attended by pupils of different races;
threats to close the public schools in the event they were integrated; dele-
gation of control of the public schools to the governor on the state legis-
lature, in hopes of frustrating federal court orders; the abolition of
compulsory schooling; tuition grants for those who did not wish to attend
integrated schools; criminal penalties for teaching in or attending an inte-
grated school .... [and] firing teachers who advocated desegregation.
RAvrrCH, supra note 53, at 133. For more details about delays and obstruction of the
implementation of the Brown opinions, see Frank T. Read,Judicial Evolution of the Law of
School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs., Winter
1975, at 7, 13-28.
For example, the Virginia Constitution was amended in 1956 to authorize the Gen-
eral Assembly and local governing bodies to appropriate funds to assist students who
would rather go to nonsectarian private schools rather than public schools. "The Gen-
eral Assembly [also] met in special session and enacted legislation to close any public
schools where white and colored children were enrolled together, to cut off state funds
to such schools, to pay tuition grants to children in nonsectarian private schools, and to
extend state retirement benefits to teachers in newly created private schools." See Grif-
fin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964). Even though the Virgina Supreme
Court ruled in 1959 that the legislation closing racially mixed schools and cutting off
funds to such schools violated Virgina's Consitution, the pupil scholarship program con-
tinued to operate. See Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959). For a discussion of
several statutes the Arkansas legislature adopted to maintain school segregation, see
Raymond T. Diamond, Confrontation as Reoinder to Compromise: Reflections on the Little Rock
Desegregation Crisis, 11 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 151, 155 (1989).
See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (rejecting a request by the Little Rock,
Arkansas school board for a two and one-half year delay in implementing a court-ap-
proved desegregation program; the school board had sought the delay because of "ex-
treme public hostility" towards desegregation engendered by the Governor of Arkansas,
who dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to block the school board's
planned desegregation of a local high school); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688
(1963) (invalidating a procedure which allowed students to transfer from a school where
their race was in the minority to a school where their race was in the majority).
264 See, e.g., Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 287-88 (1977); Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 746
(1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green, 391
U.S. at 438.
265 In many instances this unstated notion has justified African-American children
shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden of desegregation. For example, in
the desegregation plan that was in effect in Oklahoma City, black students were bused
for the first four years. Whites were then bused for only one year. See Board of Educ. v.
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
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B. The Ideological Framework That Approved Milliken H
Remedies
Twenty-three years after Brown I, the Court once again used the
ideological framework it employed in Brown I and Green when it ap-
proved "Milliken II remedies." In Milliken v. Bradley266 (Milliken II)
the Court affirmed a district court order approving remedial educa-
tional components as part of the remedy for de jure segregation of
Detroit Public Schools. 26 7 The educational components proposed
by the Detroit School Board and approved by the district court fell
into four categories: reading, 268 in-service training for teachers and
administrators, 269 revised testing procedures, 270 and counseling and
career guidance. 271
In order to justify the Milliken II remedies, the Court once again
focused on the presumed negative impact of de jure segregation on
African-American children. In reference to the African-American
school children who would continue to attend segregated schools,
the Court stated that "[c]hildren who have been.., educationally
and culturally set apart from the larger community will inevitably
acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cul-
tural isolation.... Pupil assignment alone does not automatically
remedy the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the
consequences linger .... ,,272 The Court's reasoning rests upon the
belief that racial isolation had damaged and would continue to dam-
age only African-American children. The cause of this damage, their
racial isolation, had to be treated directly. The Milliken II remedies
were therefore necessary to eradicate the consequences resulting
266 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
267 This case reached the Court because the State of Michigan objected to being
made partially responsible for funding this part of the remedy. The district court deter-
mined that the State of Michigan was just as responsible for segregation of Detroit's
public schools as the school system. Consequently, the district court assigned responsi-
bility for half of the cost of the educational components of the desegregation plan to the
Detroit Public School System and the other half to the State of Michigan. Id. at 277.
For a discussion of how the invidious value inculcation theory views the academic
remedies approved by in Milliken II, see supra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
268 Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 275. Recognition of this purely academic form of a relief
is inconsistent with my theory.
269 The purpose of the in-service training program was "to train professional and
instructional personnel to cope with the desegregation process" in order "to ensure that
all students in a desegregated system would be treated equally by teachers and adminis-
trators ...." Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 276.
270 A testing program was adopted because the district court found that black chil-
dren were "especially affected by biased testing procedures." Id. at 276 (quoting Brad-
ley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir.
1976), aff'd 433 U.S. 267 (1977)).
271 Counselors were included in the plan to address the psychological pressures that
undergoing desegregation would place on Detroit's students. Id.
272 Id. at 287.
19921
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
from the deprivation of contact with Caucasians. While the Court
noted that the problems of African-American children are not pecu-
liar to their race, the Court's reasoning dearly implied that distor-
tion in the speech, conduct and attitudes of African-American
children were the result of their racial isolation. 273
Once again, the Court did not note any possible impact or harm
to the conduct or attitudes of Caucasian children due to their isola-
tion from African-American children. As in the context of ordering
desegregation, the Court views the remedies approved in Milliken 11
as ones for the sole benefit of the African-American children. Thus,
the same implicit message-that the confinement of African-
Americans to all-black settings necessarily has a negative impact
only upon their development-is once again raised.
C. The Impact of Remedies for De Jure Segregation on the
Socializing Process of Public Schools
1. The Distinction Between the Public Schools Inculcating African-
American Inferiority and Assuming African-American
Inferiority
From the perspective of the socializing function of public
schools, an important distinction exists between viewing the harm of
de jure segregation as distorting the socializing process of public
schools and viewing the harm of dejure segregation as retarding the
cognitive, emotional, and psychological development of African-
Americans. According to the former, public schools were advocat-
ing that African-Americans were inferior to Caucasians. According
to the latter, African-Americans were actually made inferior to Cau-
casians. Under the former, racism could be viewed as an irrational
belief in the inferiority of African-Americans. Under the latter, ra-
cism has a rational basis, but the inferiority of African-Americans is
presumably curable. The implications of this fragile and fleeting
distinction are, from the perspective of the socializing function of
public schools, monumental. The question of whether remedies for
dejure segregation amounted to an attempt to cure the patient, or
an injection of the patient with a new strain of the disease, turns on
this very distinction.
If the harm of dejure segregation was that public schools were
merely asserting that African-Americans were inferior, then reme-
dies should be directed at eliminating the inculcation of this value
by public schools. The assumption underlying remedies for dejure
segregation is the public schools' instillation of blacks' inferiority
must be disestablished in as many of its myriad forms as are subject
273 Id. at 287-88.
[Vol. 78:1
DE JURE SEGREGATION
to judicial remedy.274 This "nondiscrimination" notion is consis-
tent with the view of the Constitution as a charter of negative liber-
ties. 275 Under this view, the Constitution does not impose an
affirmative duty upon schools for the benefit of African-Americans;
rather, it requires that public schools cease discriminating practices
that distort their socializing process.
If, however, we assume that the harm of de jure segregation is
not merely a distortion of the value inculcating process of public
schools but also that African-Americans were actually made inferior,
then simply disestablishing public schools' distorted value inculcat-
ing processes is not enough. Remedies for de jure segregation
would be called upon to rectify an inferior condition that exists
within African-Americans.
This distinction can be illustrated by examining a portion of a
speech delivered by Lyndon Johnson to the graduating class at
Howard University in June 1965. In that speech, Johnson analo-
gized the condition of African-Americans to a track race.
You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you
are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and choose
the leaders you please.
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by
chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race
and then say, "you are free to compete with all others," and still
justly believe that you have been completely fair.276
Apparently, Johnson assumed that slavery, discrimination, and ra-
cial isolation left their crippling mark only upon African-Americans
and that history succeeded in distorting the development of African-
Americans to such an extent that it actually made them inferior to
Caucasians. From such a position, it follows that American society's
obligation to African-Americans is to offset the negative conse-
quences of slavery, segregation, and racial isolation manifested in
African-Americans. Measures to accomplish this goal are intended
to correct, alter, alleviate, remedy, or cure African-Americans of
presumed deficiencies. While it may be true that African-Americans
are not completely responsible for their plight, they are according to
this view, inflicted with a disease that is in need of a cure.
274 See supra note 141-64 and accompanying text.
275 See Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44 VAND. L. REv. 15, 21 (1991).
276 PuB. PAPERS: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965, Commencement Address at Howard
University: "To Fulfill these rights," Doc. 301 (June 4, 1965). President Kennedy also
expressed similar sentiments about the perception that African-Americans are somehow
behind whites and need to catch up. See MEYER WEINBERG, School Integration in American
History, in LEARNING TOGETHER: A BooK ON INTEGRATED EDUCATION 3, 12 (Meyer Wein-
berg ed., 1964).
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There is another way, however, to describe the condition of
African-Americans that does not start with an assumption that casts
African-Americans into the role of "the problem." Attention should
focus not upon African-Americans, but rather on how discrimina-
tion distorted dominant attitudes held about African-Americans in
our society.
A society cannot, by law and custom, exclude a whole race from
that society's principal advantages for centuries without having an
effect upon the dominant beliefs in that society and its major institu-
tions. Such an exclusion will distort societal and institutional defini-
tions of what is important, good, of quality, of merit, appropriate,
proper-even what that society defines as justice. Such an exclusion
will affect that society's interpretation of its history, of its present
day reality, and of the very values it holds as sacred. The distortion
resulting from such an exclusion will not be cured by merely al-
lowing the excluded group an opportunity to obtain the advantages
that the society had previously denied them.
Johnson's analogy could be re-characterized by drawing upon
another sports metaphor as follows:
You do not continue to use a track in the shape of a circle because
at the time the track was developed, you excluded runners who
were better at running straight distances. Runners of straight dis-
tances are not treated fairly by being allowed to compete in the
races on a circular track. In order to be fair, you must also change
the shape of the track itself to eliminate the skewing that was de-
veloped during the time that the runners of straight distances
were excluded.2 77
The reformulated analogy accepts the harm of exclusion not as
falling upon African-Americans but rather upon the dominant be-
liefs that permeate American society. If provided assistance is con-
sidered remedial, it is remedial in the sense that it attempts to
change those dominant social beliefs about African-Americans, not
to change African-Americans themselves. The Court's ideological
framework has, unfortunately sought the latter, and thus has mis-
diagnosed the patient.
2. The Supreme Court Opinions Possess the Meaning Behind the
Remedies for Dejure Segregation
In examining segregation, it was clear that it was not racial im-
balance per se that produced the constitutional harm; rather it was
the meaning attached to it. In determining whether remedies for de
jure segregation eliminate the harm, the meaning attached to the
277 See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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remedies must be examined. Just as we looked to the assumptions
that generated the practice of de jure segregation to ascertain the
meaning behind dejure segregation of public schools, we must look
to the assumptions that generated those remedies to ascertain the
meaning behind remedies for de jure segregation.
Since remedies for dejure segregation are court-ordered reme-
dies for constitutional violations, the place to look for the meaning
behind such remedies is the ideological framework that the
Supreme Court developed. The Court's ideological framework im-
plies that the harm of de jure segregation fell only upon African-
Americans. 278 Even though de jure segregation is no longer legal,
society is still left with the problem of African-American's inferiority
that must be cured. African-Americans remain the problem and the
solution requires that we change African-Americans in order to remedy
the problem. As a consequence of this ideology, African-American
school children are viewed as the beneficiaries of remedies for de
jure segregation.279
Given the Court's ideological framework, remedies for de jure
segregation proceed from the assumption that there is something
better about Caucasians than about African-Americans. 280 As a re-
sult, while segregation in the past stood as a symbol of the inferi-
ority of African-Americans, the remedies for de jure segregation
stand in exactly the same capacity today. Rather than curing a
deficency in the value inculcating process of public schools, the rem-
edies merely replicate the disease. Instead of wielding a hypoder-
mic needle with a cure, the Supreme Court used one with a new
strain of the same plague.
D. How Remedies for De Jure Segregation Replicate the Same
Disease They Should Be Curing
This Article is not criticizing the remedies, including desegrega-
tion, that the Supreme Court ordered or approved to rectify dejure
segregation. With the Supreme Court's attention focused on the
termination of de jure segregation decrees, it is far too late to dis-
cuss what the appropriate remedies for de jure segregegation
should have been. As I approach this Article, those remedies arefait
accompli. Instead, I seek to examine the ideological framework that
produced the remedies that the Court ordered or approved. While
278 See supra notes 227-73 and accompanying text.
279 But see DERRICK BEL., Brown and the Interest Convergence-Dilemma, in SHADES OF
BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 90, 95 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980)
(arguing that school desegregation was only possible because the interest of whites sug-
gested the need for desegregation).
280 See supra notes 227-73 and accompanying text.
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the means ordered or approved are not subject to change, the
Court's ideological framework may be. An alternative conceptual-
ization of the harm of, and remedies for, de jure segregation out-
lined earlier in this Article could explain almost all of the means that
the Court has used to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation.
My criticism of the ideological framework established by Brown I
and its school desegregation progeny runs counter to the mythic
reputation that the Court's jurisprudence in this area has developed
over the years. Unquestioning admiration of Brown I and its prog-
eny blinds us to the underlying acceptance of African-American in-
feriority embodied in the remedies for de jure segregation. These
cases have always been viewed as the vindication of the rights of
African-Americans in general and their school children in particular.
The Court and supporters of school desegregation have viewed
themselves as crusaders for racial equality. Yet, the "racial equality"
sanctioned in Brown I and its school desegregation progeny is actu-
ally a new form of racial inequality.
The reader may be saying, "Certainly one cannot argue that
African-Americans were not harmed by segregation? What is wrong
with candidly admitting that the development of African-American
school children was retarded by their exclusion from contact with
whites?" The answer is simple: To the extent that racism is the
irrational judgment about the abilities of individuals based upon
their skin color, remedies proceeding from this presumed "candid
recognition" of the condition of African-Americans actually rein-
forces those judgments.
If African-Americans were as good as Caucasians, then both
blacks and whites should be beneficiaries of remedies for de jure
segregation. The Supreme Court, however, did not view interracial
exposure of Caucasians to African-Americans as a benefit for Cauca-
sian students. The presumed remedy for those judgments based
upon skin color proceeds from the notion that the judgments are
actually rational and not irrational. Thus, remedies for dejure seg-
regation are needed precisely because African-Americans are not
the equals of Caucasians. The remedies for dejure segregation, like
de jure segregation itself, therefore stand as symbolic statements
that continue to inculcate the belief that blacks are not the equals of
whites.
The unmistakable reality of this situation is what troubled me as
a fifth-grader standing in the living room of our two-bedroom
house. 281 When my parents told me that I would receive a better
education in a predominantly white suburban school, they were sim-
281 See supra notes 1 and 2 and accompanying text.
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ply reiterating the very sentiment that the Supreme Court
articulated.
By attacking the legality of de jure segregation of public
schools, African-Americans were demanding respect and equality.
They were asserting their own humanity as equals to whites and in-
sisting that their humanity be recognized. The Court converted
those demands for respect and equality into a request for a social
welfare program. African-Americans asserting their constitutional
rights were recast as beggers seeking an in-kind benefit from whites
in the form of racial contact. By converting the demand for equality
and respect into a request for a social welfare program, the Court
never rejected the premise for segregation-that whites were supe-
rior to blacks.
For the Court to have recognized the demands of African-
Americans, the remedies for dejure segregation would have to have
proceeded from the notion that blacks were already the equals of
whites. Conceptually, this would have required the Court to recog-
nize that both white and black school children were harmed by de
jure segregation, and therefore, that both black and white school
children would benefit from interracial contact.
E. How The Court's Ideological Framework Could Continue
to Impact Issues Related to Termination of Court
Decrees
As lower courts begin terminating supervision of school dis-
tricts, one issue that will be hotly debated will be whether other ar-
eas beyond the Green factors should be considered in deciding
whether the vestiges of the prior de jure conduct have been elimi-
nated. Those seeking to extend court supervision will probably ar-
gue that factors other than those related to racial balancing should
be considered. The Supreme Court's opinion in Freeman encour-
ages such an inquiry. Among the factors considered by the district
court in Freeman was the quality of education being offered to the
white and black student population. The Court noted that it was an
appropriate exercise of the district court's discretion to address
whether elements other than the Green Factors should be consid-
ered to determine full compliance. 28 2
However, in determining whether the vestitiges of the prior de
jure conduct have been eliminated due to the Court's ideological
framework, proponents of continued court supervision may be
forced into disparaging African-Americans again.283 School Board of
282 Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1446 (1992).
283 African-American school children and their parents normally challenge the ter-
mination of school desegregation decrees. See, e.g., Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438
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Richmond, Virgina v. Baliles284 illustrates this point. The School
Board of Richmond Public Schools and various students and par-
ents in the school district brought suit to obtain additional financing
from the State of Virgina for Milliken II educational programs. 285
The district court, however, converted the case into an inquiry on
terminating court supervision of Richmond's Schools. 286
The School Board conceded at trial that there was no inten-
tional discrimination in Richmond public schools that the Green fac-
tors specifically covered. 287 The plaintiffs contended, however, that
these factors were not the sole determinants of the continued exis-
tence of vestiges of de jure segregation. The plaintiffs argued that
two additional factors should be considered. The first was racial iso-
lation stemming from the fact that 86.4% of Richmond's students
were black.28 8 The second factor was the educational deprivation of
Richmond's African-American students resulting from their parents'
and their teachers' (presumably only the African-American teachers)
deficient training in State-sponsored segregated schools.289 Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiffs asserted that the parents of Richmond
(11th Cir. 1989), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851
(10th Cir. 1989); Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.
1989); Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986). Since African-
Americans are the ones objecting to the termination of these decrees, then remedies for
de jure segregation must be for the sole benefit of African-American school children.
284 Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom. School Bd. of
Richmond, Va. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987).
285 Baliles, 829 F.2d at 1310. The district court had retained jurisdiction over an
intradistrict desegregation plan for the schools of Richmond, Virginia since 1970. Id
Prior to this decision, the School Board had successfully moved to be realigned as a
plaintiff in the case. See Baliles, 639 F. Supp. at 682.
286 The plaintiffs "alleged that the state defendants had not fulfilled their constitu-
tional obligation to eradicate the vestiges of segregation in [the Richmond Public
Schools]. As a remedy, [they] sought to compel the state to fund remedial and compen-
satory programs to eliminate the lingering effects of the state's former dual system."
Baliles, 829 F.2d at 1310.
The district court's switch of the focus of the case from a discussion about the ap-
propriateness of Milliken 11 remedies to a discussion about termination of court supervi-
sion resulted from the court's attempt to determine which party had the burden of proof
with respect to whether any vestiges of past state-imposed segregation still remained in
Richmond Public Schools. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. at 682. The district court concluded
that determination of the burden turned upon whether Richmond Public Schools had
eliminated the vestiges of de jure segregation and therefore satisfied its constitutional
obligation. Id. As the Court found, if the vestiges of state imposed segregation had
been eliminated, then the burden of attempting to justify Milliken 11 remedies funded by
the state would fall upon the plaintiffs and not the state defendants. Id. The district
court denied the requested relief, see id at 702, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Baliles,
829 F.2d. at 1310.
287 Baliles, 639 F. Supp. at 688. The Green factors appear to be irrelevant in a school
district like Richmond in which 86.4% of the students were black at the time the School
Board initiated this action. Id at 693.
288 Id. at 692-95.
289 Id. at 695-99.
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school children had difficulty providing the necessary educational-
related support and that African-American teachers had difficulty
providing effective instruction to the black students. 290 The plain-
tiffs' evidence of the continuing damage that the above vestiges of
prior discrimination produced was the relatively poor performance
of African-Americans students in such academically oriented criteria
as dropout rates, scores on standardized tests, and graduation
rates. 291
The substance of the plaintiffs' arguments focused only on the
presumed impact that segregation had upon African-Americans.
The plaintiffs, in effect, argued that the negative consequences of de
jure segregation had affected not only the abilities of Richmond's
African-American students to learn but also the parenting skills of
African-American parents and the teaching skills of African-
American teachers, even though most of them were college edu-
cated. 292 In short, the plaintiffs were forced to argue not only that
present racial isolation from whites prevents blacks from being good
students but also that past racial isoloation presents them from be-
ing good parents and good teachers.293 Consistent with the ideo-
logical framework established by the Supreme Court's de jure
segregation jurisprudence, the plaintiffs were asserting that segrega-
tion actually made African-Americans inferior to Caucasians and
that continued racial isolation of African-Americans would continue
to affect them adversely.
290 I. at 696. This argument apparantly unsettled the Mayor of Richmond, who,
despite the fact that additional funds might improve the quality of education in his city,
nevertheless testified that Richmond Public School teachers were excellent and that the
"bad teacher" was an exception. Id. at 697.
291 Id. at 696. The Fourth Circuit did not disagree that the determination of the
eradication of vestiges of de jure segregation could not also include an assessment of
objective educational criteria suggested by the school board. The court stated that,
while in some circumstances it might be appropriate to use factors other than those
described in Green, the objective criteria did not support the School Board's contention
of continuing racial discrimination. Balis, 829 F.2d at 1312. The court noted that the
dropout rate in Richmond Public Schools had fallen between 1980 and 1983 from 12%o
to 7.5%o, the retention rate had fallen from 1977 to 1983 from 13.5%o to 11.5%o and the
scores on standardized achievement tests had progressively improved. Id- The court
noted that the fourth graders actually ranked above the 50th percentile nationally and
only slightly lower than the state average in reading. Id. The court went on to note that,
to the extent that students in Richmond public schools still fell below the state averages
in any academic areas, the district court's factual findings that these deficiencies were the
result the high incidence of poverty in the Richmond public schools were not clearly
erroneous. Id at 1312-13.
292 The court noted that 97.4% of the instructional personnel had college degrees
and 41.4%o held post-graduate degrees, ranking Richmond Public Schools 13th out of
the state's 135 school divisions. Balies, 639 F. Supp. at 697.
293 See supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
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Another example of the viability of the Court's ideological
framework is in the Fifth Circuit's opinion Ayers v A1lain.294 This
opinion preceded the Fifth Circuit's en banc opinion that preceded
the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Fordice. One of the
central issues in Ayers was whether continuing racial concentration
results in freedom of choice. In an opinion written by Judge
Goldberg, the majority concludes that the mere adoption of race
neutral admissions criteria is not enough to eradicate the vestiges of
de jure segregation infesting the Mississippi university system.29 5
Judge Goldberg's opinion clearly displayed sympathy with the con-
cerns of African-Americans. However, he cited the Supreme
Court's opinion in Green for the proposition that the vestiges of de
jure segregation distort only the perception of blacks.296 As Judge
Goldberg states, "Blacks do not, therefore, make choices from a
tabula rasa. Instead they choose against a history of racial subjuga-
tion with its attendent messages of inferiority." 297
The implications flowing from Judge Goldberg's statements are
obvious. Only the choices of African-Americans are distorted. And
yet, ninety-nine percent of the whites, whose choices are presumed
not to be distorted, choose not to attend historically black schools.
If only the choices of blacks are distorted and not the choices of
whites, then whites are presumably acting rationally when they
choose not to attend historically black institutions. The choices of
African-Americans to attend historically black schools presumably
reflect their distorted judgment. Why? Is it because historically
white schools, because they are white, are presumed to be better
than the historically black schools, because they are black?29 8 If so,
by definition, blacks are presumed not to be the equals of whites.
294 Ayers v. Allarn, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990)
(en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Mabus, 111 S. Ct. 1579 (1991).
295 Id. at 753.
296 Id. at 750-51.
297 Id. at 750; see also id. at 752 ("[T]here remains in Mississippi's higher educational
system vestiges of discrimination which distort the perceptions of black students. The
racial composition of the student body is not simply the result of student choice.").
298 The most obvious nonracial explanation for the choice of whites not to attend
historically black colleges is because they felt that the quality of the education at those
institutions was significantly less than that at the historically white colleges. Certainly
many of the choices by white students can be understood on those grounds. For exam-
ple, in 1980 the Board of Trustees, which had plenary power over the Mississippi univer-
sity system, designated three historically white colleges-University of Mississippi,
Mississippi State University, and University of Southern Mississippi-as comprehensive
colleges. Ayers, 893 F.2d at 738. This designation meant that these institutions were to
offer a greater number and higher level of degree programs than the remaining universi-
ties.
Of the historically black colleges, Jackson State University was probably the strong-
est academically. In fact the average faculty salary atJackson State, though less than that
at the comprehensive colleges, was more than that at the other two historically white
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While Judge Goldberg is no doubt correct that our history of
racial subordination distorts the choices of blacks, his fallacy comes
from failure to note the distortion of the choices of whites. Decisons
by whites not to attend the historically black institutions reflect the
fact that whites, too, have also been infected by the disease flowing
from de jure segregation. Their choices have also been distorted
and should not be presummed rational.
V
THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S IDEOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORK ON EDUCATORS
Law is a powerful mechanism through which our society carries
out its normative choices.29 9 Since the courts are the final arena for
resolving disputes in American society, the public discourse of
judges is given a preferred meaning and assumed to reflect accu-
rately reality. Most Americans believe in the myth of an impersonal
judiciary divining its decisions based upon some objective truth,300
and therefore view the law as an autonomous, legitimate means of
mediating social disputes.301 As Professor Wasby has pointed out,
"the principal belief about the Supreme Court-still believed by
many . . .- [is] that the Court did not make, but only found the
law." °30 2 The Court's opinions therefore operate "to validate partic-
ular conceptions of society, by legitimizing certain concrete social
arrangements.1303 Given this belief, Supreme Court opinions can
function as powerful symbolic declarations to guide, influence, and
institutions. Id. at 737. In addition, the percentage of faculty members with doctorate
degrees atJackson State exceeded that of all of the historically white colleges except for
Mississippi State University. Id. Jackson State also offered more total academic pro-
grams than either Delta State University or Mississippi University for Women. Id. at
739. Yet despite the apparent academic strength of Jackson State in comparison with
Delta State University and University of Mississippi for Women, in the 1985-86 academic
year less than 9% of the undergraduate students atJackson State were white. Id. at 735.
While academic justifications can explain why more whites did not attend historically
black institutions, those justifications cannot explain the choice of 99% of white
students.
299 Legal thought can be viewed as a language for discussing the circumstances of
the social world. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1152, 1154
(1985). Law is also knowledge in the sense that it is "vernacular characterizations of
what happens connected to vernacular imaging of what can happen." CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 215 (1983).
300 See HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL PoLmcs 42 (1988).
301 See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968).
302 STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERALJUDICIAL SYsTEM 31 (3d
ed. 1988).
303 Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 33 (1987); Gerald
Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1050 (1988).
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endorse policies made outside of a strictly judicial forum.3 4
Supreme Court opinions, especially in the context of dejure segre-
gation, contribute to either broadening or restricting 0 5 notions of
American equality. 306  These opinions, therefore, help all
Americans organize their experiences with people from different
races.
0 7
The Court's de jure segregation jurisprudence also has had a
profound impact on professional educators' beliefs about educa-
tion. 08 While the nature of this impact is of course a matter of
304 Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 810
(1990).
305 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). As Professor Aynes noted
about Plessy, "that case determined access and equality issues in the most basic aspects of
American public life for 58 years, including public accomodations and education. It was
a decision which had not merely a ripple effect but rather flooded all people in the coun-
try .... " Richard L. Aynes, An Examination of Brown in Light of Plessy and Croson:
Lessonsfor the 1990s, 7 HARV. BLAcKLErERJ. 149, 152 (1990).
Professor William E. Cross, Jr. makes this point about the impact of the Court's
acceptance of the black inferiority complex presented in scholarly works after 1954.
Beyond the Court room, however, and especially in scholarly works that
have appeared since the Court's 1954 decision, the image of [the dam-
aged African-American psyche] helped distort black history and social sci-
entific analysis of black life. By continuing to interpret the racial-
preference studies with singular rather than contrasting images, the iso-
lated and stark presence of the self-hating Negro became what the Clarks
and others never intended: a stereotype.
CROSS, supra note 228, at 38.
306 In addition to the symbolic impact of Supreme Court decisions, knowledge and
viewpoints enshrined in public schools also carry with them the imprimatur of society.
Affirmation in the context of public education of a normative pattern of a particular
cultural group will also carry with it important symbolic value. Stanley Ingber, Socializa-
tion, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy" Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U.
ILL. L. REV. 15, 24 (1987). As a consequence, Supreme Court opinions in the context of
public schools have a heightened symbolic effect.
307 The thrust of the Supreme Court's opinion that segregation made African-
Americans culturally inferior can be found in a number of educational and sociological
sources. See, e.g., EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITy 132-57 (1968); DONALD
H. BOUMA &JAMES HOFFMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION: PROBLEMS AND
APPROACHES IN NORTHERN CITY 72-73 (1968).
308 ProfessorJames Coleman, one of the supervisors of the Coleman Report, noted
how dramatic a departure the Court's view of education in Brown I was from the funda-
mental assumptions that underlaid public education at that time. With regard to under-
standing the academic role of public schools prior to Brown I, the role of the school and
the community in the education of children was seen as passive. The school's obligation
was seen to provide children an opportunity to obtain an education. But this obligation
was discharged if the school had a curriculum that would not exclude a student from
higher education, was not too distant and was free of cost (beyond the value of the
child's time). This conception did not require blacks and whites to attend the same
school. Brown I and subsequent cases amounted to a rejection of this concept of equality
of public edcuation. James Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity, 38
HARV. EDUC. REV. 7, 14-15 (1969).
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speculation,30 9 an educational reform movement arose in the wake
of the Supreme Court's decisions to desegregate public schools.
Unfortunately, that reform movement relied on the same assump-
tions that the Court employed in its de jure segregation jurispru-
dence. The basic substance of the socializing process, including the
curriculum, textbooks and other teaching materials, teacher and ad-
ministrative attitudes, and teaching strategies were seen as needing
only minor revisions. Consequently, the movement focused primar-
ily on presumed deficiencies of African-American students.
A. Impact of Desegregation on African-American School
Personnel
The impact of the assumption that dejure segregation harmed
only African-American school children expressed itself early in the
process of desegregating public schools. African-American educa-
tors paid a disproportionately high price for desegregation.310
Many scholars believe the burden of desegregation fell upon
African-Americans in the form of closing black schools and laying
off African-American teachers and principals.3 1' For example, testi-
mony before the United States Senate revealed that 96% of the
African-American principals lost their jobs in North Carolina, 90%
in Kentucky and Arkansas, 80% in Alabama, 78% in Virgina, and
309 Some educators specifically referred to language in the Court's Brown I opinion
as they discussed the need for educational reform. See, e.g., JAMES A. BANKS, MUL-
TIETHNIC EDUCATION 99 (2d ed. 1988); BouMA & HoFFmAN, supra note 307, at 72.
Another author has argued that the Court's opinion in Brown I was responsible for
broadening educators' conception of equality of educational opportunity. CHRISTOPHER
J. HURN, THE LIMrrs AND POSSIBILITIES OF SCHOOLING 112 (2d ed. 1985).
310 Not all courts were oblivious to this situation. The Fifth Circuit, for example, in
Singleton v.Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1032 (1970), specified criteria to use in the event it was necessary to reduce the
number of principals, teachers, teachers aides or other professional staff employed by a
school district. The Fifth Circuit stated that if any dismissal or demotions must be based
upon objective and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards.
"In addition if there is any dismissal or demotion, no staff vacancy may be
filled through recruitment of a person of a race, color, or national origin
different from that of the individual dismissed or demoted, until each dis-
placed staff member who is qualified has had an opportunity to fill the
vacancy and has failed to accept an offer to do so."
Id at 1218.
311 See, e.g., ALVIS V. ADAIR, DESEGREGATION: THE ILLUSION OF BLACK PROGRESS
(1984); HARRELL R. RODGERS JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
94-97 (1972); David G. Carter, Second-Generation School Integration Problems for Blacks, 13J.
BLACK STUD. 175-88 (1982); see also DERRICK BELL, Neither Separate Schools Nor Mixed
Schools: The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black Schoolchildren, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE
ELUsIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 102, 109 (1987) (citing amicus curiae brief for the
National Educational Association, United States v. Georgia, 445 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.
1971) (No. 30-338) (for empirical data on burden borne by black teachers, admin-
strators, and students because of school integration)); JAMES E. BLACKWELL, THE BLACK
COMMUNITY 158-60 (2d ed. 1985); HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL 22 (1987).
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77% in South Carolina and Tennessee.3 12 In addition, African-
American teachers were adversely affected by desegregation. The
number of terminated African-American teachers was estimated at
more than 31,000 in southern and border states.8 13
Because the judges who crafted the desegregation orders con-
sidered black schools to be inferior to white schools, the dispropor-
tionate impact on black school teachers and administrators should
have been expected. Closing African-American schools and firing
African-American teachers and principals could be perceived not as
discriminatory acts but rather as reasonable efforts to increase the
quality of education. According to the Court, not only did African-
Americans lack the intangible qualities needed for a good educa-
tion, but their minds had been infected by segregation in ways un-
likely ever to be undone.3 14
B. Effect From the Court's Ideological Framework on the
Educational Reform of America's Public Schools
Educational reformers, like the Supreme Court, generally per-
ceived the underlying premises and structures of American educa-
tion as basically sound and considered major reform unnecessary.315
The educational reform movement was based upon the same notion
articulated by the Supreme Court, that racial isolation retarded the
intellectual and psychological development only of African-
Americans. Educational reform was therefore dominated by a "cul-
tural deprivation paradigm" with respect to lower income and mi-
nority groups.3 16 As Professor Banks has pointed out, educators
312 Displacement and Present Status of Black School Principals in Desegregaed School Districts,
Hearings before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971) (Statement of Benjamin Epstein). In addition, Epstein also testified that
50% of the African-American principals lost their jobs in Georgia and 30%o did so in
Maryland. Id
313 Smith & Smith, Desegregation in the South and the Demise of the Black Educator, 20 J.
Soc. & BEHAV. Sci. 28-40 (1974).
314 In some ways what happened to African-American schools was a repeat of the
events of 100 years earlier when the Masschusetts state legislature attempted to desegre-
gate the Boston public schools. Because whites would not send their children to black
teachers, black school teachers and assistants were fired. For a discussion of the deseg-
regation of the Boston schools in the 1850s, see Arthur 0. White, The Black Leadership
Class and Education in Antebellum Boston, 42 J. NEGRO EDUC. 504, 513 (1973).
315 See BANKS, supra note 309, at 99; Myra Sadker et al., Gender and Educational Equal-
ity, in MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 106-23 (James A. Banks & Cherry A.M. Banks eds.,
1989); Geneva Gay, Achieving Educational Equality Through Curriculum Desegregation, 72 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 56, 57 (1990).
316 See, e.g., BANKS, supra note 309, at 95; CARL BRERErrER & SIEGFRIED ENGELMAN,
TEACHING DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN IN THE PRESCHOOL (1966). One review of studies
on the need to address the educational problems of disadvantaged and minority chil-
dren found that 82% of the studies stressed the need to make changes in the children
and only 8% saw a need to change the school. Doxey A. Wilkerson, Prevailing and Needed
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expressed two major goals during this movement: "to raise the self-
concepts of ethnic minority youths and to increase their racial
pride."8 17 The assumption was that ethnic groups have negative
self-concepts and negative attitudes toward their own racial and eth-
nic groups. This assumption gained momentum after Brown 1,318
where the Court adopted it and recognized the legal relevance of
social science studies.8 19
Emphases in Research on the Education of Disadvantaged Children and Youth, in THE DIsADVAN-
TAGED CHILD 275, 278 (Joe L. Frost & Glenn R. Hawkes eds., 1966).
Two African-American psychiatrists in the late 1960s also pointed to the existence
of this inferiority consciousness. They argued that the culture of slavery still infected
the American consciousness. Our country dropped its slaveholding cloak, but the inner
feelings remained the same. WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE 21
(1968).
The Head Start program, which had its genesis during this period, was also theoret-
ically grounded in a deficit perspective of black life. This program assumed that black
children likely to enter Head Start progrms would have poorly developed self-concepts.
Program evaluators predicted that participating in Head Start would increase children's
self-esteem. CRoss, supra note 228, at 59.
817 See, e.g., BANKS, supra note 309, at 99.
318 This notion was also advanced by psychologists both before and after Brown L
See, e.g., KENNETH B. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD (1955); ABRAM KARDINER &
LIONEL OVESEY, THE MARK OF OPPRESSION: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE AMERICAN
NEGRO (1951). But see CROSS, supra note 228 (arguing that scientific evidence of the low
self-esteem of Afican-Americans relied upon by the Supreme Court and promulagated
by the scientific community was flawed).
319 See CRoss, supra note 228, at 41. Even though a positive ethnic identity may not
be a birthright of African-Americans, it should not be presumed that African-Amerians
will suffer from low self-esteem. In his informative book on African-American psychol-
ogy, Cross has conducted an extensive review of the psychological literature of African-
Americans. He has argued that a person's self-concept ("SC") is a function of both a
general personality domain or personal identity ("P") and a reference group orienta-
tion ("RGO") (SC = PI + RGO). Id at 42. The PI "focuses on variables, traits, or
dynamics that appear to be in evidence in all human beings, regardless of social class,
gender, race, or culture." Id. at 43. PI "examines so-called universal components of
behavior." Id It includes such personality traits as self-esteem, self-worth, self-confi-
dence, interpersonal competence, and ego-ideal. Id Because PI is present in all people,
the same assessment techniques or tests can be used for different racial, ethnic, and class
groups. Id at 43-44.
In contrast to PI, people also have an RGO which is composed of the "aspects of the
'self' that are culture, class and gender specific." Id. at 45. Whereas PI attempts to cut
through social class, ethnicity, and gender in its search for the common core of human
behavior, RGO seeks "to discover differences in values, perspectives, group identities,
lifestyles and world views." Id. RGO is an "ethnographic dimension of self-concept."
Id. RGO "tries to discover what events or symbols within each culture or subgroup
stimulates anxiety, fear, and so on." Id.
Research conducted on PI examines the dynamics and the structure of the self. Id.
"RGO studies establish the content, context, symbols, values, and reference groups for
the self." For example,
though.., everyone eats food .... what a person eats, how it is prepared
and what utensils they use are different across cultures but are very cul-
ture specific. Similarly, every human being relies upon people or groups
as a point of reference .... but which persons or groups one relies on
reveals the specific nature of one's group identity or RGO. To say "I like
people" is a universal human propensity, but it offers little about ones
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Educators assumed that students with healthy self-concepts are
better learners and would fare better in school.3 20 These goals ar-
ticulated by educational reformers could be traced to the Court's
statement in Brown I that segregation made African-Americans feel
inferior and that this inferiority affected their motivation to learn.3 2 '
The focus of the educational reform movement was to correct both
the omission of racial minorities3 22 and women from the curriculum,
and the "stereotypical images and biased views of racial
minorities."3 23
particular cultural frame, but to say "I like and prefer to socialize with
fellow Jews" leaves little doubt about the core of one's RGO.
Id.
Early black identity research (1939-1960), including Kenneth Clark's famous doll
research, focused exclusively on the RGO component of SC for African-Americans.
These studies are generally understood as establishing a preference by blacks for white
symbols. Id at 51. Because blacks evinced more of an out-group orientation than
whites, they were presumed to have a low or negative view of their racial group. Id.
These early studies did not address the PI component of SC. Id. at 52. Rather, they
assumed that a persons's racial RGO was highly correlated with a person's PI. Id at 51.
In other words, it was presumed that since blacks evinced a preference for white sym-
bols, they must necessarily have low self-esteem. But the presumption of the high corre-
lation between blacks's racial RGO and self-esteem was not tested. Id
The advent of the black power movement in 1968 had a tremendous impact on the
racial RGO studies conducted on African-Americans. Id. at 52. Studies on the racial
RGO of blacks conducted between 1968-1980 indicate a significant increase in the pref-
erence of blacks for black symbols. Id. at 52-53. Yet a review of the PI studies show that
blacks had a normal level of self-esteem before and after the black power movement. Id
at 73. If a black person's self-esteem is highly correlated with their racial group orienta-
tion, then the increase in black preference for black symbols occurring after 1968 should
have produced an increase in black self-esteem. Id at 57.
Cross says that one of the main reasons for this continuity is that the variability that
blacks demonstrate on general personality, self-esteem, and personal identity tests is not
correlated with the variabilty they evidence on measures of racial preference, group
identity, or reference group orientation. Mentally healthy blacks do not share the same
racial group identity and likewise, having a certain racial identity for blacks is no guaran-
tee of mental health or mental illness. The reason is because race may not be the most
salient dimension of a black person's RGO. Some blacks make religion, sexual prefer-
ence, socioeconomic status, simply being an American, or any number of other refer-
ence group orientations more salient than race.
320 BANKS, supra note 309, at 99; BouMA & HOFFMAN, supra note 307, at 78-87; see also
BOUMA & HOFFMAN, supra note 307, at 72 (concluding that the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of the psychological damage to African-American children caused by past segrega-
tion is "the heart of the educational problem" encountered by many of these children in
the post-Brown era).
321 See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
322 Until the mid-1960s, African-Americans were virtually absent from textbooks
used in America's public schools. FRANCES FrrzGERALI, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY
SCHOOLBOOKS IN THE TWENTIEI CENTURY 84-85 (1979). Most textbooks did not begin
to show blacks as free people until the late 1940s. Prior to that time, they were primarily
depicted as slaves. Id at 83; Robert K. Landers, Conflict Over Multicultural Education,
CONG. Q, Nov. 30, 1990.
323 Gay, supra note 315, at 56.
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The movement, however, embodied the notion that the self-
concept of ethnic minorities would increase if they were portrayed
as "colored whites. '3 24 As stated by Professor Jones, "the popular
notion of 'cultural deprivation' as a description of black children at-
tests to a wholesale disregard of black life and culture."3 25 The tex-
tual changes of commerical publishers substituted only biological
variety. As a result, Dick and Jane retained all of their usual white
middle-class social and behavioral traits, but now had black and
brown faces.3 26 While the traditional instructional programs were
revised to recognize the contributions of ethnic minorities and wo-
men that had previously been neglected, only those who satisfied
the Anglocentric norms of acceptability and excellence were in-
cluded.3 27 Thus, attempts to include blacks merely grafted ethnic
content onto white instruction that was typified by the traditional
educational program.3 28
In addition to changes in the curriculum, "a number of cultural
enrichment projects that took minority students to concerts, art gal-
leries, scientific laboratories, and museums were included."3 29
While these programs exposed minority children to the artifacts and
traditions of America's mainstream, they embodied the same under-
lying message as the Supreme Court's opinions-racial minorities
would improve if they dropped their deviant culture and traits and
adopted the requisite mainstream traits.330 Because educators saw
minorities as the problem,33 ' white students attending desegregated
schools were seldom exposed to the histories and cultures of their
324 "By the early seventies, most of the books had been rewritten to include a history
of blacks in America." FrrZGERALD, supra note 322, at 84-85. While textbook writers
revised their view of Reconstruction, for the most part the rest of the textbooks involved
no alterations from those that existed when African-Americans were virtually excluded.
See id
325 James M. Jones, The Concept of Racism and its Changing Reality, in IMPACTS OF RA-
CISM ON WHITE AMERICANS 40-41 (Benjamin P. Bowser & Raymond G. Hunt eds.,
1981).
326 Gay, supra note 315, at 59.
327 Id at 58.
328 Larry Cuban, Ethnic Content and "White" Instruction, in TEACHING ETHNIC STUDIES
104 (J. Banks ed., 1973).
329 Gay, supra note 315, at 59.
330 Mildred Dickerman, Teaching Cultural Pluralism, in TEACHING ETHNIC STUDIES,
supra note 328, at 19; see also Jones, supra note 325, at 40-43.
331 Virtually all African-Americans have had experiences with whites that involve
statements of whites such as "my best friend is black" or "I marched for Civil Rights in
the 1960s" or "I enjoyed the TV miniseries called 'Roots'" or "I too am concerned
about the resurgence of open racism." Underneath this veneer of what may be genuine
concern is what W.E.B. DuBois called the unasked question of blacks by whites-"How
does it feel to be a problem?" W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 15 (1903).
Some whites find the question too delicate to ask, others have trouble framing it. Id
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minority classmates.332 Based upon this deficit model, it is not sur-
prising that many studies found that desegregation actually had a
negative impact on the self-esteem of African-American school
children. 333
The focus on African-Americans as the problem also justified
teacher attitudes viewing African-American students as the source
of their own academic difficulties.33 4 Such teachers see the problem
as one of defective raw material as opposed to a defective educa-
tional process. 33 5 Educators view disparate suspension rates for
African-Americans as normal because they expect black students to
engage in negative behavior.33 6
332 See CARL A. GRANT & CHRISTINE E. SLEETER, AFTER THE SCHOOL BELL RINGS
(1986).
333 See, e.g., NANCY H. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN
(1975); Walter G. Stephan, School Desegregation: An Evaluation of Predictions Made in Brown
v. Board of Education, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 217, 227-28 (1978) ("None of the desegrega-
tion studies [reviewed] found that desegregation had positive effects on black self-
esteem, but 25% found that desegregation had negative effects.").
334 See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON POLICY FOR RACIALJUSTICE, VISIONS OF A BE'TER WAY: A
BLACK APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLING 16-17 (1989) (The Committee is a group of
prominent black scholars, which is headed by Duke Universtiy historian John Hope
Franklin); Karl H. Clauset, Jr. & Alan K. Gaynor, A Systems Perspective on Effective Schools,
EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Dec. 1982, at 54, 55; Stephen K. Miller, School Learning Climate Im-
provement, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Dec. 1982, at 36, 37; see also Bradley v. Milliken (Milliken
II), 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1975), alf'd, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), af'd,
433 U.S. 267 (1977) (noting that lack of reading skills causes minority students to be-
come disciplinary problems and leads teachers to assume they cannot be educated).
335 African-American students in desegregated schools have been disproportion-
ately assigned to lower academic tracks. E.g.,Jeannie Oakes, Limiting Opportunity: Student
Race and Curricular Diferences in Seconday Vocational Education, 91 AM. J. EDUC. 328, 348
(1983). All too often this is simply a manifestation of negative attitudes and expecta-
tions concerning the prospective academic abilities of African-American students. See
Norman Miller & Merle Linda Zabrack, IQ, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 89, 100-01 (Har-
old B. Gerard & Norman Miller eds., 1975).
336 There have been a few cases where African-Americans attempted to argue that
disparate expulsion rates of African-American students resulted from race-motivated
disciplinary practices. See, e.g., Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that statistical evidence of disparities in punishment of black and white students,
combined with prior findings of racial discrimination in disciplinary enforcement, does
not establish prima facie discrimination by a school district); Rhyne v. Childs, 359 F.
Supp. 1085 (N.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Sweet v. Childs, 507 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1975)
(A melee occurred shortly after the implementation of a school desegregation plan. Al-
most all of the students suspended were black, but the court found no reason to inter-
vene concluding that the attitude of the students was one of noncooperation and
nonparticipation); Tillman v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 327 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Fla. 1971)
(finding no discrimination by a school principal who suspended 87 black students and
only 6 white students after an inter-racial fight. The court found no evidence that race
started the disturbances and attributed the higher number of suspensions among black
students to the fact that when the groups were separated, blacks were kept on campus,
making their identification easier).
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CONCLUSION
Viewing the harm of dejure segregation as invidious value in-
culcation sees the harm resulting from dejure segregation as a cor-
ruption of the socializing process of public schools. This position is
based not so much upon an assumption that de jure segregation of
public schools left a lasting impact on African-Americans, but
rather, that de jure segregation left a lasting impact on the social-
izing process of public schools.33 7 By viewing remedies for de jure
segregation as a remedy to the distortion in the value transmission
process of public schools, the meaning attached to desegregation is
as a corrective measure to eliminate the inculcation of an invidious
value.
If the Court firmly establishes that the harm of dejure segrega-
tion was its impact only on the socializing process of public schools,
it would amount to the Court declaring that African-Americans are
equal to their Caucasian counterparts. The Court would value
African-Americans for what they are, rather than attempting to
make them something they cannot become. Thus, the Court would
not be suggesting that African-Americans reject their racial culture
as deviant in order to succeed in public schools. Instead, society
would assume that ethnic diversity is a positive element, because it
enriches a nation and increases the ways in which its citizens can
perceive and solve personal and public problems. It recognizes that
both races can learn from interracial contact.
One could raise a legitimate question: Why should the Court
now consider articulating an ideological framework for remedies for
de jure segregation that differs from the one it has previously em-
ployed? Although, one might agree that the Court should have
been more careful with its wording in the past, given the Court's
opinions in Dowell and Freeman, shouldn't this entire area be put in
the Supreme Court's collective past?
The Court's dejure segregation termination opinions will raise
a considerable number of issues that will have to be resolved. Of
particular importance will be the issue regarding funding inequali-
ties between black and white schools that are the result of private
decision making. The Court's current framework may force those
who do not wish to eliminate court supervision to disparage African-
Americans further, in an effort to maintain that supervision. Thus,
in the process of terminating court supervision, negative messages
about African-Americans are likely to be repeated.
In addition to redeeming its ideological framework, the Court
could also have a salutary effect on America's public education. The
337 See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text.
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effort to reform America's public schools is far from complete.338
Given the increasing numbers of racial minority students in public
schools,339 and public school's poor success with effectively educat-
ing students, the need for continued educational reform is obvi-
ous.5 40 While the appropriate educational reformers should be
professional educators not federal judges,3 41 the role which the
Supreme Court could perform is to establish an ideological frame-
work that would directly focus the need for educational reform on
the socializing process of public schools. By providing the theoreti-
cal underpinnings, the Court could function as a catalyst for educa-
tional reform without attempting to determine what the proper
solutions should be.
Explaining the harm of dejure segregation in the context of the
value inculcating function of public schools will provide the theoret-
ical underpinnings to release the reformist efforts of educators to
develop and implement programs directed at bias in the educational
process. While it may not be completely clear to lawyers and judges
how educators will respond, it might suggest the beginnings of a
restructured American educational program.
This new ideological framework could provide educators with a
needed mandate to reconsider the secondary level of invidious value
inculcation. Not all educators have been unaware of the fact that the
traditional educational program undervalues the contribution of mi-
norities.3 42 Some educators are in the process of rethinking the very
foundations of school curricula by focusing on culturally pluralistic
338 A number of sources have pointed to the crisis that looms in America's public
school system. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION
AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983) (report of a blue-ribbon
commission proclaiming that the United States is a nation at risk of losing its slim com-
petive edge in world markets because of the poor quality of its educational system);
ENEST L. BOYER, HIGH SCHOOL (1983); DENIS P. DOYLE & DAVID T. KEARNS, WINNING
THE BRAIN RACE (1988); JONATHAN KoZOL, ILLITERATE AMERICA (1985).
339 One sociologist has noted that "the proportion of non-Hispanic white students is
projected to decline from three-fourths of the total school enrollment to two-thirds by
the turn of the century .... Karl Taeuber, Desegregation of Public School Districts: Persis-
tence and Change, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1990, at 18, 24. As it does, the need for public
schools to take a different approach to education will become more and more acutely
obvious.
340 The officially acknowledged dropout ("pushout" may be a more appropriate
term) rate from high school of African-Americans in many metropolitan areas is more
than 30%. Some knowledgeable sources say it is actually closer to 50% in several cities.
Jeff Howard & Ray Hammond, Rumors of Inferiority, in RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL
JUSTICE (Russell Nieli ed., 1991).
341 See Brown, supra note 9, 1163-64.
342 See, e.g., CHRISTINE E. SLEETER & CARL A. GRANT, MAKING CHOICES FOR MUL-
TICULTURAL EDUCATION (1988); MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION, supra note 315; Gay, supra
note 315, at 57; Steinberger, Multicultural Curriculum Uncovers Common Bonds, Indivdual
Strength, Fiery Debate, 48 SCH. ADMIN. 8, 9 (1991).
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content, perspectives, and experiences.3 43 Their particular aim and
focus is to allow all students to achieve academic excellence without
jeopardizing personal identities or cultural integrity, thereby fulfil-
ling the Fourteenth Amendment's moral imperative of an egalita-
rian society.3 44 The precise parameters of these revisions of public
education should be left to educators to work out in succeeding
years. But at least the Supreme Court will have provided an intel-
lectual framework that will act as a catalyst in directing educator's
energies in that direction.
343 A task force appointed by New York State Education Commissioner Thomas So-
bol concluded that the curriucular material used by the State of New York contributed to
the miseducation of all young people through a systematic bias toward European culture
and its derivatives. At the direction of the New York Board of Regents, Sobel has since
formed a committee of preeminent scholars and educators to review existing social stud-
ies curriculum and recommend changes. Steinberger, supra note 342, at 9. California is
also revising its traditional educational curriculum to provide for a greater presentation
and appreciation of ethnic diversity. See Landers, supra note 322, at 686-89.
344 Gay, supra note 315, at 58.
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